Econ-15 · economics · computer science · Computational economics

Econ-15 · CS-850

Payoff characterization of convergence for a fixed mirror-descent rule

LLM status Partially solved unverified

C73 — Stochastic and Dynamic Games - Evolutionary Games - Repeated Games Economics catalogue AnthropicOpenAIopenaiclaude opus 5.5gpt 6 astra progpt 6 astra ultragpt-6 astragpt-6 astra pro 25% cataloguednot recordedPartially solved

Statement

GT-018 | Learning dynamics and potential structure
R | Formal algorithm-specific classification agenda.

Definitions and mathematical statement

Fix action sets $S_i$ and proper lower-semicontinuous strictly convex regularizers $h_i:\Delta(S_i)\to\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}$, finite and differentiable on the relative interiors, together with a positive step-size sequence $(\eta_t)$. Let \[ D_{h_i}(p,x)=h_i(p)-h_i(x)-\langle\nabla h_i(x),p-x\rangle \] be the Bregman divergence. In a finite game $G$, let $v_i(x)$ be the vector with coordinates $u_i(a_i,x_{-i})$. A specified simultaneous online mirror-descent rule is \[ x_i^{t+1}=\underset{p\in\Delta(S_i)}{\operatorname{argmax}} \{\eta_t\langle v_i(x^t),p\rangle-D_{h_i}(p,x_i^t)\}. \] Assume the declared regularizers and step sizes make each update uniquely defined and remain within the domain of $\nabla h_i$. For this fixed rule $D$, define \[ \mathcal G_D=\{G:\ \forall x^1\in\operatorname{relint}X, \ \lim_{t\to\infty}\operatorname{dist}(x^t,\operatorname{NE}(G))=0\}. \] Give necessary and sufficient conditions, in terms of the game's payoff arrays, for $G\in\mathcal G_D$.

Short English statement

Which games make a specified adaptive update converge to the Nash set from every interior starting point?

Variants and scope boundaries

The update rule, learning rates, and convergence notion cannot be left implicit. Potential structure does not guarantee convergence for every arbitrary discrete-time step size. Statistical prediction of convergence from a scalar potentialness measure is different from a necessary-and-sufficient theorem. Requiring convergence to a single equilibrium strengthens set convergence.

Source relationship and status

[S1] studies potentialness and explicitly calls the general characterization problem open. The displayed mirror-descent family, universal initialization requirement, and fixed schedule are editorial choices that make one member of that agenda a defined mathematical target.

References

[S1] Martin Bichler, Davide Legacci, Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Matthias Oberlechner, and Bary Pradelski (2025). Characterizing the Convergence of Game Dynamics via Potentialness. arXiv:2503.16285v1. Locator: Sections 3--4 for games and potentialness; Section 6 for the convergence-classification agenda. https://arxiv.org/html/2503.16285v1

Common conventions: Source mathematical conventions

Finite games. For a finite set $A$, $\Delta(A)$ is its probability simplex. Players choose independent mixed strategies in Nash equilibrium; correlation is allowed only when explicitly part of the solution concept. In a game with payoff functions $u_i$ and strategy profile $x$, an additive $\varepsilon$ Nash equilibrium satisfies \[ u_i(x)\geq u_i(x_i',x_{-i})-\varepsilon \quad\text{for every player $i$ and every admissible deviation $x_i'$}. \] For numerical approximation, payoffs are normalized as locally specified. An $\varepsilon$ payoff residual is distinct from distance at most $\varepsilon$ to the set of exact equilibria. Point convergence, convergence of empirical play, and convergence in distance to an equilibrium set are also distinct.

Computational representations. Unless stated otherwise, a complexity question takes rational data with binary encoding; polynomial time is measured in total bit length. A fixed-accuracy polynomial algorithm is not necessarily polynomial in $1/\varepsilon$, and neither is necessarily polynomial in $\log(1/\varepsilon)$. Succinct games and value, demand, or sampling oracles must declare their interfaces. Exact real solutions require an explicit representation; an unspecified list of arbitrary real numbers is not a finite computational output. A claimed algorithmic barrier is meaningful only for its specified model and reductions.

Dynamic games. Histories, information, observation, and allowable randomization are part of the model. A stationary strategy depends only on the current state; a positional strategy in a deterministic graph game chooses one action at each controlled vertex. Nash equilibrium at an initial state and equilibrium after every history are different requirements. An expectation of a pathwise $\liminf$ payoff, a $\liminf$ of expected averages, a limiting expected average, and a uniform finite-horizon equilibrium are different criteria. None is silently substituted for another.

Allocation and mechanisms. A complete allocation assigns every item exactly once unless otherwise stated. Zero-valued goods, negative values, capacity constraints, feasibility, lotteries, and copies of goods affect fairness definitions and are specified locally. Dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, Bayesian incentive compatibility, universal truthfulness, and truthfulness in expectation impose different inequalities. Whenever an objective ratio has zero denominator, its convention is stated or those instances are excluded.

Infinite-dimensional models. Expectations, integrals, stochastic equations, and optimization objectives require their local regularity, integrability, filtrations, and admissible domains. A backward--forward mean-field system is a boundary-value problem; it is not an initial-value semiflow without an additional construction. Long-time, large-population, and vanishing-noise limits require an order of limits and a convergence topology. If a minimum need not be attained, the objective is its infimum or supremum and the approximation requirement is stated separately.

Statement licence: CC-BY-4.0 · Source file

Contributions 3

Econ-15-A2 · Exploration · LLM-generated · gpt 6 astra pro ·

GPT 6 Astra Pro attempt on Econ-15

Research attempt and adversarial verification

9 October 2026 Original-target status: UNRESOLVED

C73-15: Payoff characterization for a fixed mirror-descent rule

Input: C73-15.tex.  Tools: web browsing [YES]; Python computation [YES].

1) FORMAL RESTATEMENT

Fix finite nonempty action sets, proper lower-semicontinuous strictly convex regularizers $h_i$ on their simplexes, differentiable and finite on the relative interiors, and a sequence $\eta_t>0$. Let $X=\prod_i\Delta(S_i)$ and $v_i(x)_a=u_i(a,x_{-i})$. For an interior starting point define \[ D_{h_i}(p,x)=h_i(p)-h_i(x)-\langle\nabla h_i(x),p-x\rangle, \quad x_i^{t+1}={\operatorname*{arg\,max}}_{p\in\Delta(S_i)} \{\eta_t\langle v_i(x^t),p\rangle-D_{h_i}(p,x_i^t)\}. \] As in the input, assume uniqueness of every update and that all iterates remain where the required gradients are defined. The target is a condition on $u$ for \[ \forall x^1\in\operatorname{relint}X,\qquad \operatorname{dist}(x^t,{\operatorname{NE}}(G))\longrightarrow0. \] The rule, including every step size, is fixed before testing a game. The input does not select one particular regularizer or schedule, so a theorem for a special choice is a partial classification, not a solution for the whole family.

The main specialization below is negative entropy $h_i(p)=\sum_a p_a\log p_a$, with $0\log0=0$ and natural logarithms. It gives \[ x_{i,a}^{t+1}= \frac{x_{i,a}^{t}\exp(\eta_t v_{i,a}(x^t))} {\sum_bx_{i,b}^{t}\exp(\eta_t v_{i,b}(x^t))}. \tag{MD} \] The formula is the unique optimizer: the first-order conditions of the strictly concave entropy-regularized objective give the displayed positive probabilities, and normalization determines the multiplier. Hence the interior-domain condition is satisfied for every finite step.

2) QUICK LITERATURE/CONTEXT CHECK

Bichler et al. [potentialness] distinguish potential structure from general learning convergence and explicitly discuss the absence of a comprehensive classification. Their empirical potentialness measure is not a necessary-and-sufficient theorem for the particular discrete rule above. The following schedule-sensitive statements and counterexamples are proved directly.

3) ATTACK PLAN

Proof track. Obtain exact log-ratio recursions for entropy; classify the finite-total-step case using initializations near every vertex; identify positive subclasses when total learning time is infinite.

Construction track. Try a one-player game with summable steps, a zero-sum mixed-equilibrium game, and an identical-payoff game with a large constant step. These test three different failed generalizations.

Tools and purpose. Entropy first-order conditions make updates explicit; log odds remove normalization; uniform payoff bounds control finite total movement; closedness of the Nash set permits vertex tests; strict convexity supplies an energy inequality; invariant diagonal profiles reduce a two-player update to one variable; exact logarithmic identities certify a two-cycle.

4) WORK

Theorem (Complete classification for summable entropic steps): For the entropy rule (MD), suppose $S=\sum_{t\geq1}\eta_t<\infty$. Then the universal convergence property holds if and only if the game is strategically constant: \[ u_i(a_i,s_{-i})=u_i(b_i,s_{-i}) \quad\text{for all }i,a_i,b_i,s_{-i}. \tag{SC} \] Equivalently, ${\operatorname{NE}}(G)=X$.
Proof: If (SC) holds, all pure actions of a player have the same payoff against every mixed opponents' profile. Every mixed profile is therefore Nash, proving sufficiency.

For necessity choose $M$ with $|u_i(s)|\leq M$ for every player and pure profile. Multilinearity gives $|v_{i,a}(x)|\leq M$ on $X$. Iterating the ratio form of (MD), \[ \frac{x_{i,a}^{t}}{x_{i,b}^{t}} =\frac{x_{i,a}^{1}}{x_{i,b}^{1}} \exp\left(\sum_{s<t}\eta_s[v_{i,a}(x^s)-v_{i,b}(x^s)]\right). \] Fix an arbitrary pure profile $a^*$. Take interior starting points with $x_{i,a_i^*}^{1}\geq1-\delta$. Summing the ratios to $a_i^*$ gives, for every $t$, \[ \frac{1-x_{i,a_i^*}^{t}}{x_{i,a_i^*}^{t}} \leq e^{2MS}\frac{\delta}{1-\delta}. \] Thus every iterate is within a quantity tending to zero with $\delta$ of the vertex $a^*$. If the assumed universal Nash-set convergence holds, compactness provides a subsequential Nash limit with the same closeness bound. Letting $\delta\downarrow0$ and using that the Nash set is closed shows $a^*\in{\operatorname{NE}}(G)$. Every pure profile is therefore Nash. For fixed $i,s_{-i}$, the profiles $(a_i,s_{-i})$ and $(b_i,s_{-i})$ give both opposite best-response inequalities, forcing equality of the two payoffs. This proves (SC). ∎

The necessity argument uses the universal interior-initialization quantifier. It does not assert that one preselected interior starting point must fail in every nonconstant game.

Proposition (Two positive tests when total learning time is infinite): Under (MD), if $\sum_t\eta_t=\infty$, every one-player finite game converges to its optimal-action simplex. Also, every finite game in which each player has a strictly dominant pure action converges to the corresponding pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof: For one player, let $c_a$ denote its fixed payoff and $S_t=\sum_{s<t}\eta_s$. The exact formula is \[ x_a^t=\frac{x_a^1e^{c_aS_t}}{\sum_bx_b^1e^{c_bS_t}}. \] If $c_a<\max_b c_b$, its ratio to a maximizing action tends to zero. Ratios between maximizing actions remain their initial ratios, proving the asserted convergence.

If $a_i^*$ strictly dominates every other action, finiteness gives $v_{i,a_i^*}(x)-v_{i,b}(x)\geq\delta_i>0$ for every $x$ and $b\ne a_i^*$. The same ratio recursion bounds $x_{i,b}^t/x_{i,a_i^*}^t$ by its initial value times $e^{-\delta_iS_t}$. All the undesired masses tend to zero. The dominant profile is Nash by definition. ∎

Theorem (Zero-sum does not guarantee last-iterate convergence): For matching pennies \[ A=\begin{pmatrix}1&-1\\-1&1\end{pmatrix},\qquad B=-A, \] the simultaneous entropy rule fails to approach the Nash set from every interior initialization other than the equilibrium, for every positive step sequence.
Proof: Write $p,q$ for the first-action probabilities and $z=\log(p/(1-p))$, $w=\log(q/(1-q))$. The unique Nash equilibrium is $p=q=1/2$: a nonindifferent opponent would force a pure best reply, and no pure pair is mutually optimal; indifference requires exactly these probabilities. The ratio recursion gives \[ z^{t+1}=z^t+2\eta_t\tanh(w^t/2),\qquad w^{t+1}=w^t-2\eta_t\tanh(z^t/2). \] Set $E(z,w)=\log\cosh(z/2)+\log\cosh(w/2)$. Its Hessian is diagonal with strictly positive entries $\tfrac14\operatorname{sech}^2(z/2)$ and $\tfrac14\operatorname{sech}^2(w/2)$. The displacement above is orthogonal to $\nabla E$. Strict convexity therefore gives $E(z^{t+1},w^{t+1})>E(z^t,w^t)$ unless $(z^t,w^t)=(0,0)$. Starting elsewhere, energy stays at least $E(z^1,w^1)>0$. Convergence to the unique Nash profile would make $(z^t,w^t)\to(0,0)$ and the energy tend to zero, which is impossible. This argument uses no lower bound on $\eta_t$ and no assumption on its total sum. ∎
Theorem (An exact two-cycle in an exact potential game): Let both payoff matrices be $A=B=\left(\begin{smallmatrix}0&1\\1&0\end{smallmatrix}\right)$, take $\eta_t=4\log3$, and initialize $p^1=q^1=3/4$. Then the entropy iterates alternate between $(3/4,3/4)$ and $(1/4,1/4)$. Neither profile is Nash.
Proof: The common payoff itself is an exact potential. Symmetry preserves $p=q$. For the common log odds $z$, the payoff difference between the first and second actions is $1-2p=-\tanh(z/2)$, so \[ z^{t+1}=z^t-4\log3\,\tanh(z^t/2). \] At $z=\log3$, $\tanh(z/2)=1/2$, and the next value is $-\log3$. Oddness gives the reverse step. At $(3/4,3/4)$ the expected payoff is $3/8$ and switching to the second pure action gives $3/4$; at $(1/4,1/4)$ switching to the first gives the same improvement. The periodic orbit is disjoint from the closed Nash set, so its distance from that set is positive. ∎
This is a counterexample to arbitrary-step potential convergence, not to the summable-step classification, whose assumptions it does not satisfy.

5) VERIFICATION

For a one-player two-action game with rewards $(1,0)$, initialization $(1/2,1/2)$, and $\eta_t=2^{-t}$, the exact limit is $(e/(1+e),1/(1+e))$, not an optimum. This tiny case checks the finite-total-step obstruction without interactions. A one-action player contributes no condition to (SC), and a wholly constant game trivially passes every rule.

The script verifies the potential two-cycle with a floating-point round-trip error below $10^{-12}$; its proof is the exact identity involving $\log3$ above. It also checks 100 strict matching-pennies energy increases from log odds $(0.7,-0.4)$ with step $0.1$. Minimal pseudocode is

\begin{lstlisting} for t:     for each player and action:         new_log_weight = log(old_weight) + eta[t] * payoff_vector[action]     normalize each player's new weights simultaneously \end{lstlisting}
Simultaneity matters: using one player's new probabilities in the other player's update would be a different algorithm. The proof never treats negative entropy as differentiable on the boundary. None of the failures concerns convergence of time-averaged play to a correlated equilibrium.

\Needspace{8\baselineskip}

6) FINAL

LABEL: UNRESOLVED.

Strongest checked partial result. A complete payoff-array classification for entropy with summable positive steps; positive infinite-total-step subclasses; an all-positive-schedules matching-pennies obstruction; and an exact potential-game two-cycle for a specified constant step.

Exact first gap. For arbitrary fixed regularizers and nonsummable schedules, no necessary-and-sufficient payoff-array criterion is proved.

Next three moves.

  1. For nonsummable entropy steps, identify a payoff condition that controls last-iterate rather than averaged regret and survives all interior initializations.
  2. For a specified potential array, determine a sharp step-size stability bound; the exact cycle supplies a concrete large-step test.
  3. Extend the finite-total-step vertex argument to regularizers for which a uniform, initialization-sensitive movement bound can actually be proved.
Counterexample perspective. Two actions and two players already suffice to break both zero-sum and potential-based universal claims. They do not establish that an arbitrary specified rule has no useful convergent class.

Reproducibility and scope.
This is one of eleven companion reports. The bundle includes verify.py and its executed results. Finite experiments supplement the proofs; they are not proofs of asymptotic claims. Literature coverage is targeted, and no novelty or formal proof-assistant certification is claimed.

References

  • [potentialness] Martin Bichler, Davide Legacci, Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Matthias Oberlechner, and Bary Pradelski. Characterizing the Convergence of Game Dynamics via Potentialness. arXiv:2503.16285, version 1 (2025). https://arxiv.org/html/2503.16285v1.

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Econ-15-A1 · Exploration · LLM-generated · gpt 6 astra ultra ·

GPT 6 Astra Ultra attempt on Econ-15

Payoff characterization of convergence for a fixed mirror-descent rule GPT 6 Astra Ultra

Target and chosen specialization

The full target fixes a mirror-descent rule, including its regularizers and step sizes, and asks which payoff arrays make every interior trajectory approach the Nash set. This attempt treats the negative-entropy regularizer \[ h_i(x_i)=\sum_a x_{i,a}\log x_{i,a},\qquad x_{i,a}^{t+1}=\frac{x_{i,a}^t\exp(\eta_t v_{i,a}(x^t))} {\sum_b x_{i,b}^t\exp(\eta_t v_{i,b}(x^t))}. \] The formula follows by differentiating the strictly concave constrained objective; positivity and normalization give the unique optimizer. All initial probabilities are strictly positive. The complete classification below for summable step sizes is an elementary consequence of bounded total log-odds movement. Its priority is not claimed. The general agenda and the need to specify the dynamics come from [potential].

An exact classification for finite total learning time

Call a game strategically trivial if, for every player $i$, every two of its actions $a,b$, and every pure opponent profile $s_{-i}$, \[ u_i(a,s_{-i})=u_i(b,s_{-i}). \]
Theorem (Summable entropy steps): Fix finite nonempty action sets and positive step sizes with $H=\sum_{t=1}^{\infty}\eta_t<\infty$. For the simultaneous entropy update, the following are equivalent:
  1. Every interior initial profile yields distance to the Nash set tending to zero.
  2. The game is strategically trivial.
Every trajectory in every finite game converges to an interior profile under these step sizes, whether or not that profile is Nash.
Proof: Choose $M>0$ bounding all absolute pure payoffs. For any two actions, \[ \log\frac{x_{i,a}^{t+1}}{x_{i,b}^{t+1}} =\log\frac{x_{i,a}^{t}}{x_{i,b}^{t}} +\eta_t\left(v_{i,a}(x^t)-v_{i,b}(x^t)\right). \] The increments are absolutely summable, being bounded by $2M\eta_t$. All log odds therefore converge to finite real numbers. Fixing one reference action for each player and normalizing their limiting odds proves convergence to a profile with all coordinates strictly positive.

If the game is strategically trivial, all action payoffs of each player coincide at every mixed opponent profile. Every update is the identity, and every profile is Nash.

Conversely suppose that, at a pure opponent profile $s_{-i}$, some actions $a,b$ satisfy $u_i(a,s_{-i})-u_i(b,s_{-i})=g>0$. Choose $\theta>0$ so small that $4M\theta<g/2$. Select interior initial beliefs for every opponent $j\ne i$ such that \[ \sum_{c\ne s_j}\frac{x_{j,c}^1}{x_{j,s_j}^1} <\frac{\theta e^{-2MH}}{\max\{1,n-1\}}. \] The log-odds bound shows that the same sum of odds at any time is less than $\theta/\max\{1,n-1\}$. The probability that some opponent deviates from $s_{-i}$ under the product distribution is consequently less than $\theta$. The expected payoff difference between $a$ and $b$ differs from $g$ by at most $4M\theta$, since the difference takes values in $[-2M,2M]$. It is thus greater than $g/2$ at every time and at the limiting profile. Player $i$'s limiting probability of $b$ is positive. A profile giving positive mass to a strictly suboptimal action is not Nash. For $n=1$ the same argument uses no opponents and the payoff difference is exactly $g$.

The Nash set is closed: it is specified by finitely many weak continuous best-response inequalities. Since the trajectory converges to a point outside this set, its distance to the set cannot tend to zero. This disproves the universal-initialization property whenever the game is not strategically trivial. ∎

Infinite total time does not suffice

Proposition (Matching pennies obstruction for every positive schedule): Consider the two-player zero-sum game with row payoff matrix $\left(\begin{smallmatrix}1&-1\\-1&1\end{smallmatrix}\right)$. For the entropy update with any positive step-size sequence, no interior trajectory starting away from the unique Nash equilibrium approaches the Nash set.
Proof: Let $p,q$ be the probabilities of the first actions and put $z=\log(p/(1-p))$, $w=\log(q/(1-q))$. The update is \[ z'=z+2\eta\tanh(w/2),\qquad w'=w-2\eta\tanh(z/2). \] Define \[F(z,w)=\log\cosh(z/2)+\log\cosh(w/2).\] This is strictly convex, with gradient \[\nabla F(z,w)=\tfrac12(\tanh(z/2),\tanh(w/2)).\] The inner product of this gradient with $(z'-z,w'-w)$ is zero. Strict convexity therefore gives $F(z',w')>F(z,w)$ unless $(z,w)=(0,0)$. Since $F(0,0)=0$ and $F$ is positive elsewhere, a trajectory starting elsewhere cannot tend to $(0,0)$. Direct best-response comparison gives the unique Nash equilibrium $p=q=1/2$. Convergence in distance to that singleton would force $z,w\to0$, a contradiction. ∎
Proposition (An exact potential game with a discrete two-cycle): Let both players receive one when their binary actions differ and zero when they coincide. For a constant entropy step size $\eta>4$, some interior initial profile has an exact period-two orbit disjoint from the Nash set.
Proof: Identical payoffs make the common payoff an exact potential: each unilateral payoff difference equals the potential difference. In log odds the update is \[ z'=z-\eta\tanh(w/2),\qquad w'=w-\eta\tanh(z/2). \] There is $c>0$ with $\eta\tanh(c/2)=2c$. Indeed, the left side minus $2c$ is zero at zero, has derivative $\eta/2-2>0$ there, and is negative for $c>\eta/2$. The intermediate value theorem gives a positive root. Starting at $(z,w)=(c,c)$ gives $(-c,-c)$, and the next step returns to $(c,c)$. At either point both players put positive mass on both actions, but each strictly prefers the less likely opposing action. Neither profile is Nash. Since this is a finite orbit disjoint from the closed Nash set, its distance from that set has a positive minimum. ∎

What this settles and what it leaves open

The summable-step theorem is a complete payoff characterization for one specified family of rules. The two adversarial examples show why neither divergence of total step size nor exact potential structure can alone classify arbitrary simultaneous discrete updates. They do not contradict a continuous-time convergence theorem or a theorem requiring sufficiently small steps. General nonsummable entropy schedules and other regularizers remain outside the classification proved here.

References

  • [potential] M. Bichler, D. Legacci, P. Mertikopoulos, M. Oberlechner, and B. Pradelski, Characterizing the Convergence of Game Dynamics via Potentialness, arXiv:2503.16285v1 (2025), Sections 3--4 and 6. https://arxiv.org/html/2503.16285v1. The primary preprint and its stated classification agenda were inspected on 9 October 2026. The discrete calculations here are independent proofs, not claims that its convergence results apply to every step size.

Completion Estimate

25%

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Econ-15-A3 · Partial result · LLM-generated · gpt-6 astra, claude opus 5.5, gpt-6 astra pro

C73-15: A closed-certificate characterization for every fixed mirror-descent rule

C73-15: A closed-certificate characterization
for every fixed mirror-descent rule

Ji Ho Bae
LawAll AI

10 October 2026

The characterization is infinitary. No finite recognition algorithm, step-size-independent potential criterion, or familiar-game-class list is claimed. The construction retains the arbitrary specified regularizers and positive schedule, including allowed boundary iterates. The fixed mirror-descent family, schedule, and universal-interior-initialization target are the specialization C73-15 of the broader source agenda; the result does not classify every learning dynamic in that agenda.

Exact target and the form of the answer

Fix $d\ge1$ players and nonempty finite action sets $S_i$, $i=1,\ldots,d$, $X_i=\Delta(S_i)$, and $X=\prod_iX_i$. The fixed rule has proper lower-semicontinuous strictly convex regularizers $h_i:X_i\to\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}$, finite and differentiable on $\operatorname{relint} X_i$, and steps $\eta_t>0$. For a game's payoff array $U$, write $u_i^U$ for its multilinear extension and $v_i^U(x)_a=u_i^U(a,x_{-i})$. The exact simultaneous update is \begin{equation} x_i^{t+1}=\underset{p\in X_i}{\arg\max} \left\{\eta_t\langle v_i^U(x^t),p\rangle -h_i(p)+h_i(x_i^t) +\langle\nabla h_i(x_i^t),p-x_i^t\rangle\right\}. \label{wsref-0-65-71-3a-6d-64} \end{equation} We retain the canonical assumption that these updates are uniquely defined and remain in the declared gradient domain from every interior initialization. No assertion is made about a payoff array for which this assumed rule is undefined.

Our answer associates to $U$ countable trees $T_{a,b}(U)$, $a,b\in\mathbb N_{>0}$. Node validity is a finite closed feasibility problem: it uses fixed regularizer epigraphs, regularizer evaluations at interior probes and interpolated interior points, the specified steps, and explicit payoff polynomials. The interpolated points depend on the finite feasibility variables; the regularizers themselves remain fixed rule data. It contains no Nash set, convergence assertion, infinite trajectory, or gradient evaluation. The condition on the payoff array is \begin{equation} \boxed{\quad T_{a,b}(U)\text{ is well-founded for every }a,b\ge1.\quad} \label{wsref-0-65-71-3a-77-66} \end{equation} Equivalently each tree admits a strictly decreasing countable-ordinal ranking. The full definition is in Section 4. Sections 2--3 explain why its finite constraints encode interior-ray slopes and exact updates without imposing Fréchet differentiability or continuity of the boundary gradient.

Closed certificates for interior-ray slopes

For each $i$, fix an enumeration $(q_{i,\ell})_{\ell\ge1}$ of the rational points of $\operatorname{relint} X_i$. It is dense in $\operatorname{relint} X_i$, hence in $X_i$. All numbers $h_i(q_{i,\ell})$ are finite and fixed before testing $U$. For a singleton simplex repeat its unique point.

We normalize a declared gradient by choosing its representative $g$ with $\sum_{s\in S_i}g_s=0$. Adding a constant to all gradient coordinates has no effect on a Bregman divergence or on (eq:md). The proof uses only the defining directional property of a gradient on each interior ray: \begin{equation} \lim_{\theta\downarrow0} \frac{h_i(x+\theta(q-x))-h_i(x)}{\theta} =\langle\nabla h_i(x),q-x\rangle\qquad(q\in\operatorname{relint} X_i). \label{wsref-0-65-71-3a-64-70} \end{equation} This holds both for a Fréchet gradient and for a linear finite-domain Gâteaux gradient. We do not assert a uniform expansion at a boundary point, or finite regularizer values in a whole boundary neighborhood. A selected subgradient unrelated to these directional derivatives would be a different notion from the declared gradient.

Lemma (Dense interior-ray certificate): Let $P$ be a finite-dimensional simplex and let $h:P\to\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}$ be proper, lower semicontinuous and convex, finite on $\operatorname{relint} P$. Fix dense interior probes $(q_\ell)$. For $x\in P$, $c\in\mathbb R$, and a normalized vector $g$, the following are equivalent:
  1. $h(x)=c$, and the derivative along each fixed probe ray exists and satisfies \begin{equation} \lim_{\theta\downarrow0}\frac{h(x+\theta(q_\ell-x))-h(x)}{\theta} =\langle g,q_\ell-x\rangle\qquad(\ell\ge1). \label{wsref-0-65-71-3a-64} \end{equation}
  2. $c\ge h(x)$, and, for every $\ell$, \begin{equation} E_\ell:=h(q_\ell)-c-\langle g,q_\ell-x\rangle\ge0; \label{wsref-0-65-71-3a-67-31} \end{equation} for every pair of integers $\ell,k\ge1$ there is an integer $N_{\ell,k}\ge1$ such that, writing $z_{\ell,k}=(1-1/N_{\ell,k})x+q_\ell/N_{\ell,k}$, \begin{equation} 0\le h(z_{\ell,k})-c- \frac{\langle g,q_\ell-x\rangle}{N_{\ell,k}} \le\frac{\|q_\ell-x\|}{kN_{\ell,k}}. \label{wsref-0-65-71-3a-67-32} \end{equation}
The conclusion is the displayed ray identity. It does not assert full Fréchet differentiability at an arbitrary coded boundary point.
Proof: A convex function finite on a relative open set is continuous there. One elementary justification is to enclose a small neighborhood in a simplex whose vertices lie in that set. Convexity bounds the function above by the largest vertex value; reflection about the center then bounds it below. Applying these bounds on a slightly larger neighborhood gives bounded secant slopes, hence continuity on the smaller one.

Assume the second condition. The epigraph inequality makes $h(x)$ finite. Interior continuity extends (eq:g1) to all interior $q$. Choose one fixed interior $q^0$ and put $z_\theta=(1-\theta)x+\theta q^0$, $0<\theta\le1$. Convexity and lower semicontinuity give \[ \lim_{\theta\downarrow0}h(z_\theta)=h(x): \quad h(z_\theta)\le(1-\theta)h(x)+\theta h(q^0), \quad h(x)\le\liminf_{\theta\downarrow0}h(z_\theta). \] Letting $\theta\downarrow0$ in (eq:g1) at $z_\theta$ yields $c\le h(x)$. Thus $c=h(x)$.

The supporting inequality extends to any finite-value boundary point $p$ by applying it to $(1-\theta)p+\theta q^0$ and using the same limit identity. It is automatic when $h(p)=+\infty$. Consequently \begin{equation} h(p)-h(x)-\langle g,p-x\rangle\ge0\qquad(p\in P). \label{wsref-0-65-71-3a-73-75-70} \end{equation}

\begin{samepage} For a fixed probe $q_\ell$, convexity makes its secant quotient \[
\phi_\ell(\theta)=\frac{h(x+\theta(q_\ell-x))-h(x)}{\theta},
\qquad 0<\theta\le1,
\] nondecreasing as a function of $\theta$. Its limit at zero is therefore its infimum, possibly an extended real number before the certificate is used. \end{samepage}
By (eq:sup) every quotient is at least $\langle g,q_\ell-x\rangle$. Multiplying (eq:g2) by $N_{\ell,k}$ gives \[ \phi_\ell(1/N_{\ell,k}) \le\langle g,q_\ell-x\rangle+\|q_\ell-x\|/k. \] Hence the infimum is at most the right side for every $k$, and equals $\langle g,q_\ell-x\rangle$. This proves (eq:d), without uniformity over directions.

Conversely, (eq:d) and secant monotonicity imply (eq:g1). For each fixed $\ell,k$, the quotients along $\theta=1/N$ decrease to the finite value in (eq:d), so some integer $N$ makes their excess at most $\|q_\ell-x\|/k$. When $q_\ell=x$ the excess is identically zero. This is (eq:g2). ∎

At a point where the original rule declares a gradient, (eq:dp) and (eq:d) identify the certificate vector with its normalized representative. Indeed their inner products with every $q_\ell-x$ agree. By density these vectors span the affine tangent space, and normalization removes the only ambiguity, an all-coordinate constant. We will use this identification only at points already identified as actual iterates of the declared rule.

Lemma (Dense-probe optimizer certificate): Suppose $p\in P$, $c=h(p)\in\mathbb R$, and $y$ is a finite vector. Then $p$ maximizes $\langle y,z\rangle-h(z)$ over $P$ if and only if \begin{equation} h(q_\ell)-c-\langle y,q_\ell-p\rangle\ge0\qquad(\ell\ge1). \label{wsref-0-65-71-3a-6f} \end{equation}
Proof: The inequalities extend first to the interior by continuity, then to finite-value boundary points by the convex-segment limit used above. Infinite-value points cannot improve the objective. The extended inequalities are exactly the maximization assertion. The reverse implication is immediate. ∎

These lemmas do not assume continuity of the boundary gradient. For a finite list of probes, (eq:g1) is closed. With an integer $N_{\ell,k}$ fixed, the interpolated point lies in the relative interior for every $x\in P$. Every coordinate of that point is at least the corresponding positive coordinate of $q_\ell/N_{\ell,k}$, so all such points belong to a compact subset of the relative interior. Thus $h(z_{\ell,k})$ is continuous in $x$, and both inequalities in (eq:g2) are closed. The epigraph condition $c\ge h(x)$ is closed by lower semicontinuity. These closure facts are the reason for retaining ray-specific denominators as integer node labels instead of assuming that finite mirror-descent trajectories depend continuously on their initialization.

Payoff polynomials and compact initial cores

Define pure-deviation regrets \begin{equation} R_{i,s}^U(x)=u_i^U(s,x_{-i})-u_i^U(x),\qquad R^U(x)=\max_{i,s}R_{i,s}^U(x). \label{wsref-0-65-71-3a-72} \end{equation} They are explicit polynomials in mixed-action probabilities, with coefficients from $U$. For example \begin{equation} u_i^U(x)=\sum_{z\in\prod_jS_j}U_i(z)\prod_jx_{j,z_j}, \qquad v_i^U(x)_s=\sum_{z_{-i}}U_i(s,z_{-i})\prod_{j\ne i}x_{j,z_j}. \label{wsref-0-65-71-3a-70} \end{equation} For an integer $a\ge1$, let \begin{equation} K_a=\{x\in X:x_{i,s}\ge1/a\text{ for every }i,s\}. \label{wsref-0-65-71-3a-6b} \end{equation} Each $K_a$ is compact, possibly empty, and $\bigcup_{a\ge1}K_a=\operatorname{relint} X$. Thus compact cores cover precisely all permitted initial profiles, even arbitrarily close to the boundary.

The finite node test and the payoff criterion

Fix $a,b\ge1$. A node of depth $r\ge1$ has only finite discrete labels:

  • strictly increasing integer times $1\le T_1<\cdots<T_r$;
  • player/action labels $(i_j,s_j)$, one for each marked time;
  • positive integer bounds $B_t$, $1\le t\le T_r$;
  • positive integer denominators $N_{i,t,\ell,k}$, $1\le i\le d$, $1\le t\le T_r$, $1\le\ell,k\le r$.
The empty node is the root. Truncation from depth $r$ to depth $r-1$ retains the earlier marked times and their labels, the bounds with $t\le T_{r-1}$, and denominator labels with $t\le T_{r-1}$, $\ell,k\le r-1$. Extensions must retain all those labels unchanged. Therefore the set of possible nodes is countable. The continuous variables below are feasibility witnesses, not node labels.

A depth-$r$ node is valid if the following finite system has a solution in variables $x^t\in X$, $c_{i,t}\in\mathbb R$, $g_{i,t}\in\mathbb R^{S_i}$, $1\le t\le T_r$:

  1. Compact bounds and initial core: \begin{equation} x^1\in K_a,\qquad |c_{i,t}|\le B_t,\qquad |g_{i,t,s}|\le B_t,\qquad \sum_sg_{i,t,s}=0. \label{wsref-0-65-71-3a-66-31} \end{equation}
  2. Epigraph and finite supporting probes: for every $i,t$, \begin{equation} c_{i,t}\ge h_i(x_i^t),\qquad E_{i,t,\ell}:=h_i(q_{i,\ell})-c_{i,t} -\langle g_{i,t},q_{i,\ell}-x_i^t\rangle\ge0 \quad(1\le\ell\le r). \label{wsref-0-65-71-3a-66-32} \end{equation}
  3. Finite interior-ray secants: for every $i,t$ and $1\le\ell,k\le r$, put \[ z_{i,t,\ell,k}= \left(1-\frac1{N_{i,t,\ell,k}}\right)x_i^t +\frac{q_{i,\ell}}{N_{i,t,\ell,k}}. \] Require \begin{equation} 0\le h_i(z_{i,t,\ell,k})-c_{i,t} -\frac{\langle g_{i,t},q_{i,\ell}-x_i^t\rangle}{N_{i,t,\ell,k}} \le\frac{\|q_{i,\ell}-x_i^t\|}{kN_{i,t,\ell,k}}. \label{wsref-0-65-71-3a-66-33} \end{equation}
  4. Finite update probes: for $1\le t<T_r$, every $i$, and $1\le\ell\le r$, \begin{equation} h_i(q_{i,\ell})-c_{i,t+1} -\left\langle g_{i,t}+\eta_t v_i^U(x^t), q_{i,\ell}-x_i^{t+1}\right\rangle\ge0. \label{wsref-0-65-71-3a-66-34} \end{equation}
  5. Marked payoff gaps: \begin{equation} R_{i_j,s_j}^U(x^{T_j})\ge1/b\qquad(1\le j\le r). \label{wsref-0-65-71-3a-66-35} \end{equation}
The tree $T_{a,b}(U)$ consists of its root and its valid nodes under the specified truncation. Validity is inherited by truncation, since all retained constraints occur among the child's constraints.

Every test is finite and closed in its real feasibility variables. In particular, for each fixed denominator label the argument of the regularizer in (eq:f3) ranges in a compact subset of its relative interior, where it is continuous. The payoff dependence occurs only in the polynomials (eq:p), (eq:f4), and (eq:f5). Everything else belongs to the fixed rule and the fixed probe system. The root can be included even when $K_a$ is empty; then it has no valid children and is well-founded.

Theorem (Full payoff characterization): For every payoff array $U$ for which the canonical fixed rule is well-defined and gradient-domain preserving as assumed, the following are equivalent:
  1. For every $x^1\in\operatorname{relint} X$, the exact simultaneous rule (eq:md) satisfies $\operatorname{dist}(x^t,\operatorname{NE}(U))\to0$.
  2. The payoff-array criterion (eq:wf) holds for the finite tests (eq:f1)--(eq:f5).
  3. For every $a,b$, there is a countable ordinal $\alpha_{a,b}$ and a map $\rho_{a,b}:T_{a,b}(U)\to\alpha_{a,b}$ strictly decreasing from a node to each proper extension.

Proof of the full equivalence

Regret and distance have the same vanishing criterion. The function $R^U$ is continuous and nonnegative: a player's mixed payoff is a convex combination of its pure-action payoffs, so at least one of its pure deviations has nonnegative regret. Moreover $R^U(x)=0$ if and only if every pure deviation is unprofitable, which is equivalent by linearity to $x\in\operatorname{NE}(U)$. The Nash set is nonempty by the finite-game existence theorem [nash] and is closed in compact $X$.

For any sequence $z_t\in X$, if its distance to the Nash set tends to zero, uniform continuity of $R^U$ implies $R^U(z_t)\to0$. Conversely, if $R^U(z_t)\to0$ but its Nash distance does not, a subsequence with distance at least some $\varepsilon>0$ has a compact subsequential limit $z$. Continuity gives $R^U(z)=0$, hence $z\in\operatorname{NE}(U)$, a contradiction.

Failure of convergence produces an infinite branch. Suppose an actual trajectory from interior $x^1$ fails to approach the Nash set. Choose $a$ with $x^1\in K_a$. Its nonnegative regrets fail to tend to zero, so for some $b\ge1$ there are strictly increasing times $T_j$ with $R^U(x^{T_j})\ge1/b$. Choose a player and a pure action attaining this maximum at each such time.

Put $c_{i,t}=h_i(x_i^t)$, and let $g_{i,t}$ be the normalized relative gradient supplied by the declared rule. All these numbers are finite. Choose integer $B_t$ exceeding their absolute values. Property (eq:dp) and Lemma Lemma (Dense interior-ray certificate) supply integer denominators $N_{i,t,\ell,k}$ for every date, probe, and precision. Fix each such choice once. Lemma Lemma (Dense-probe optimizer certificate) applied to (eq:md) gives all the update inequalities. At depth $r$, the actual finite prefix through $T_r$ satisfies (eq:f1)--(eq:f5). Its labels extend the preceding node. These nodes form an infinite branch of $T_{a,b}(U)$, so (eq:wf) fails.

An infinite branch produces one exact bad trajectory. Conversely, suppose $T_{a,b}(U)$ has an infinite branch. Its marked times strictly increase and therefore tend to infinity. Along the branch every bound $B_t$ is eventually assigned and never changed. Each denominator $N_{i,t,\ell,k}$ is also eventually assigned and never changed.

At each depth choose one finite feasibility witness. Extend it beyond its last date by arbitrary points of the coordinate boxes \begin{equation} \prod_{t\ge1}\left[X\times \prod_i[-B_t,B_t]\times\prod_i[-B_t,B_t]^{S_i}\right]. \label{wsref-0-65-71-3a-62-6f-78} \end{equation} These boxes are all compact and nonempty. Extract a subsequence converging in the first date's coordinates, then a subsequence converging in the second date's coordinates, and so on. The diagonal subsequence converges coordinatewise to arrays $(x^t,c_{i,t},g_{i,t})_{t\ge1}$. Each constraint from any fixed node involves only finitely many coordinates and is closed; all sufficiently deep witnesses satisfy it. Its limit therefore satisfies that constraint. This proves simultaneously every constraint on the branch, without assuming continuity of a mirror-descent trajectory map.

For fixed $i,t$, each probe $\ell$ and precision $k$ eventually occurs in a branch node. Hence the limit arrays satisfy the full conditions of Lemma Lemma (Dense interior-ray certificate), with the same fixed denominator for each pair. It follows that $c_{i,t}=h_i(x_i^t)$, and the vector $g_{i,t}$ has the certified linear slopes on every fixed interior probe ray. We do not infer a full Fréchet gradient at an arbitrary coded boundary point. All update probes eventually occur as well, so Lemma Lemma (Dense-probe optimizer certificate) identifies $x_i^{t+1}$ as the maximizer with score $g_{i,t}+\eta_t v_i^U(x^t)$.

We now identify the sequence with the actual declared rule by induction. The first point belongs to $K_a\subseteq\operatorname{relint} X$, where the original gradient exists. Its directional slopes satisfy (eq:dp). The certified slopes (eq:d) match them on every probe ray, and the dense directions span the tangent space. Therefore $g_{i,1}$ is the original normalized gradient. The optimizer just identified is the original (eq:md) optimizer and is unique, so $x^2$ is the actual next iterate. The canonical admissibility assumption puts $x^2$ in the original declared gradient domain. At this known actual point, (eq:dp), the certified ray identities, and dense spanning again identify $g_{i,2}$ with the normalized original gradient. The same argument proves the assertion at every date.

This induction uses the original gradient-domain preservation; it does not deduce that arbitrary points admitted by a ray certificate belong to that domain. It permits the original finite-domain Gâteaux interpretation as well as the Fréchet interpretation, and does not require the regularizer to be finite near an allowed boundary iterate.

Finally all marked inequalities (eq:f5) survive in the limit, so $R^U(x^{T_j})\ge1/b$ at infinitely many dates. This trajectory does not approach the Nash set. We have proved the equivalence of assertions 1 and 2.

The ordinal version. For a countable well-founded tree, well-founded recursion defines \[ \rho(v)=\sup\{\rho(w)+1:w\text{ is an immediate child of }v\}, \qquad \sup\varnothing=0. \] Each rank is a countable ordinal, since each node has at most countably many children and a countable supremum of countable ordinals is countable. The tree has countably many nodes, so all its ranks are bounded by a single countable ordinal. The ranks strictly decrease along extensions. Conversely an infinite branch would give an infinite strictly decreasing sequence of ordinals, which is impossible. This proves assertions 2 and 3 equivalent and completes Theorem Theorem (Full payoff characterization).

Scope

The original regularizers and every original step are retained. No entropy, summability, small-step, strong-convexity modulus, potential structure, gradient Lipschitz bound, or boundary-gradient continuity is added. The interior initial set is covered by all compact cores, rather than replaced by one selected core. The update is unique by hypothesis, so there is no additional tie-breaking convention. All players use the same old profile in the simultaneous payoff vectors of (eq:f4). The target is distance to the Nash set, not action convergence, time-averaged convergence, or convergence to one equilibrium.

The condition is a payoff-structure criterion in a closed-certificate sense: it consists of explicitly specified finite constraints with payoff-polynomial coefficients, followed by well-foundedness or an ordinal ranking. Real trajectory coordinates appear only as finite feasibility variables and are eliminated from the countable tree itself. Neither exact gradient evaluation nor infinite orbit quantification defines node validity. The supporting regularizer probes and ray-specific secant certificates are needed because ordinary compactness applied to unclosed update graphs would be insufficient.

This is an infinitary representation. An arbitrary fixed regularizer or step sequence need not have an effective finite encoding. Even decidability of each finite node test would not decide well-foundedness of the entire tree. Accordingly no recognition algorithm or running-time bound is claimed. For general regularizers these finite tests need not be polynomial or semialgebraic: fixed epigraph membership is part of the rule's data.

The tree has countably many possible waiting times and secant-denominator labels. In general, countable well-founded trees need not have finite height; the criterion itself imposes no uniform finite horizon. No uniform bound on the number of bad dates or natural-number ranking is inferred. Countable ordinals retain the full pointwise-in-initialization convergence property.

A boundary test for pointwise ray certificates

On the three-action simplex write the first two probabilities as $x,y$, so $x,y\ge0$ and $x+y\le1$. Consider \begin{equation} h(x,y)=x^2+y^2+\frac{y^2}{\sqrt x}\quad(x>0),\qquad h(0,0)=0,\qquad h(0,y)=+\infty\quad(y>0). \label{wsref-0-65-71-3a-62} \end{equation} It is proper and lower semicontinuous. The Hessian of $y^2/\sqrt x$ for $x>0$ has nonnegative diagonal entries and determinant $y^2/(2x^3)\ge0$, so this term is convex there. Nonnegativity gives lower semicontinuity at the origin, and the term $y^2/\sqrt{x}$ tends to infinity when $x\downarrow0$ and $y$ approaches a positive boundary value. For a segment from the origin to a finite-value point with $x>0$, $h(tx,ty)=t^2(x^2+y^2)+t^{3/2}y^2/\sqrt{x}\le t h(x,y)$ for $0\le t\le1$; the interior Hessian handles all other finite-value segments, so the stated extension is convex. Adding $x^2+y^2$ makes $h$ strictly convex, and it is smooth on the relative interior.

At the vertex $(0,0)$, every finite-domain ray has linear directional gradient zero: for a fixed interior probe $q=(a,b,1-a-b)$, put $d=q-(0,0,1)=(a,b,-a-b)$, using the ambient Euclidean norm. Then \[ \frac{h(\theta a,\theta b)}{\theta} =\theta(a^2+b^2)+\sqrt\theta\,\frac{b^2}{\sqrt a} \longrightarrow0. \] Yet $h(r^4,r)=r^8+r^2+1$ does not even tend to $h(0,0)$. A uniform Fréchet certificate would exclude this declared weak boundary gradient. The ray certificate includes it: take $c=0$, $g=0$. The supporting probes are nonnegative, and, for each fixed $q$ and $k$, choose a sufficiently large integer $N$ so that \[ N h(a/N,b/N)=\frac{a^2+b^2}{N}+\frac{b^2}{\sqrt{aN}} \le\frac{\|d\|}{k}. \] This is exactly (eq:g2), with no uniformity over probes required.

For one player, $\eta_1=1$, payoff vector $(7/8,-7/2,0)$, and the interior profile $(1/16,1/4,11/16)$, the regularizer gradient representative is $(-15/8,5/2,0)$. The next optimization score is $(-1,-1,0)$, so its unique optimizer is $(0,0,1)$: every other point has strictly negative score minus the nonnegative regularizer. If the declared boundary gradient is the finite-domain linear directional gradient zero, the following unit-step optimizer is $(7/16,0,9/16)$. The ray certificate permits this exact prefix. We do not use this test as a replacement for the full theorem or claim a separate all-initialization convergence result from this prefix.

Use of AI tools

The author used research AI agents that the author built and configured (GPT-6 Astra max, Claude Opus 5.5 max and GPT-6 Astra Pro) during the proof work, for proof search and construction, proof checking, translation, Python computation and similar tasks. The final manuscript was written, and the proofs were checked, by the human author. All responsibility for this work rests with the author personally.

References

  • [potentialness] Martin Bichler, Davide Legacci, Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Matthias Oberlechner, and Bary Pradelski. Characterizing the Convergence of Game Dynamics via Potentialness, arXiv:2503.16285v1, submitted 20 March 2025. https://arxiv.org/html/2503.16285v1. Sections 3--4 provide game/potentialness context; Section 6 states the general classification agenda.
  • [nash] J. F. Nash, Jr., Equilibrium points in n-person games, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 36$1$, 48--49 $1950$, DOI: 10.1073/pnas.36.1.48. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC1063129/.

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