Dynamic games with incomplete information
LLM status Open unverified
C73 — Stochastic and Dynamic Games - Evolutionary Games - Repeated Games Economics catalogue openaigpt 6 astra ultra 55%60% cataloguednot recordedOpenStatement
Original atlas ID: M4. Formulation: editorial specification of a research family.
Definitions and assumptions
Consider a finite-horizon stochastic game at dates $t=0,\ldots,T$, with players $N$, public state $x_t\in X$, private state $s_{it}\in S_i$, and action $a_{it}\in A_i$, all on finite sets. Initial-state and signal distributions, state-transition kernels, observation rules, and utilities are indexed by a structural parameter $\gamma\in\Gamma$. Players discount by a specified $\beta\in(0,1]$. Behavioral strategies depend on each player's information history. Let $\mathcal E(\gamma)$ be the sequential-equilibrium assessments of the resulting finite extensive-form game: strategies are sequentially rational and beliefs are limits of Bayes beliefs induced by completely mixed strategies. Let $P_{\gamma,e}^{\rm obs}$ be the induced observable-data law under assessment $e$. Sampling across independent markets is specified separately.
Formal research question
For an observed population law $P$, characterize \[ \Gamma_I(P)=\{\gamma\in\Gamma:\exists e\in\mathcal E(\gamma),\ P_{\gamma,e}^{\rm obs}=P\}. \] If a policy $d$ changes specified primitives, define its outcome functional $W(\gamma,e;d)$ and the counterfactual range \[ \mathcal W_I(d)=\{W(\gamma,e;d):\gamma\in\Gamma_I(P),\ e\in\mathcal E_d(\gamma)\}. \] Which restrictions on private-state persistence, signals, transitions, and cross-market selection make these sets informative? Develop algorithms with verified equilibrium residuals and valid approximation bounds for their extrema, together with statistical confidence regions that accommodate sampling uncertainty. A comparative policy effect requires a stated joint selection assumption or an explicitly worst-case difference between counterfactual ranges.
Interpretation and scope
The finite-horizon formulation ensures that the equilibrium concept and belief consistency are well defined. Infinite-horizon applications require their own equilibrium existence and information-state assumptions; a convenient public Markov state does not automatically summarize histories when private information persists. Hidden-state identification and equilibrium multiplicity can each cause observational equivalence, even when a numerical solver returns one equilibrium reliably. Error in solving an equilibrium must be separated from error in estimating parameters and from uncertainty about selecting equilibria after intervention. A proposed scalable method should therefore report feasibility, incentive residuals, treatment of off-path beliefs, and approximation coverage, rather than claiming that optimization success proves global identification.
Source audit and status
Ericson--Pakes (1995), Bajari--Benkard--Levin (2007), and Aguirregabiria--Mira (2007) are verified. They concern dynamic industry and Markov-game models under specific state, shock, and equilibrium restrictions. They are important antecedents but do not establish a general solution for arbitrary persistent hidden states and endogenous belief histories. In particular, unobserved transitory payoff shocks are not equivalent to unrestricted evolving private-state information. The atlas title is broader than its citations directly support. The extensive-form model, identified sets, and counterfactual selection treatment above are editorial extensions; the entry remains a methodological agenda, with already solved special models rather than one certified open theorem.
References
- S1 Richard Ericson and Ariel Pakes (1995). Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work. Review of Economic Studies 62(1), 53--82. https://academic.oup.com/restud/article-abstract/62/1/53/1568000. Locator: abstract; industry equilibrium model. Establishes: A dynamic industry framework with entry, exit, and firm-specific uncertainty. Does not establish: a solution for arbitrary hidden persistent states and unobserved beliefs.
- S2 Patrick Bajari, C. Lanier Benkard, and Jonathan Levin (2007). Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition. Econometrica 75(5), 1331--1370. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00796.x. Locator: abstract; two-step estimation procedure. Establishes: Estimation under Markov-perfect behavior and specified observable-state restrictions. Does not establish: identification of every incomplete-information dynamic game.
- S3 Victor Aguirregabiria and Pedro Mira (2007). Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games. Econometrica 75(1), 1--53. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00731.x. Locator: abstract; nested pseudo-likelihood method. Establishes: A sequential estimator addressing computational and multiplicity issues under stated assumptions. Does not establish: generic identification under unrestricted persistent private information.
Common conventions: Source mathematical conventions
Unless an entry states otherwise, agent and firm sets are finite. State and action spaces are measurable, strategies and outcome maps are measurable, probability laws are specified, and expectations exist for the targets under discussion. Infinite-horizon discount factors lie in $(0,1)$ and discounted objectives are finite. Norms, tolerances and complexity input sizes must be specified for computational comparisons. Constants or primitives that appear locally are inputs, not empirical facts asserted by this catalogue.
Identification. A statistical model $m\in\mathcal M$ implies an observable law $P_m$ and target $\theta(m)$. At law $P$, its identified set is \[ \Theta(P;\mathcal M)=\{\theta(m):m\in\mathcal M,\ P_m=P\}. \] Point identification holds when this set is a singleton, or equivalently when $P_{m_1}=P_{m_2}$ implies $\theta(m_1)=\theta(m_2)$ for all compatible models. Sharp bounds mean bounds attained, or approached when the boundary is not attained, by compatible models. Writing this set is a definition, not a solution: the substantive task is to establish informative restrictions and derive or estimate the set. An unrestricted-confounding model may give only trivial bounds.
Inference. Identification, estimability and valid uncertainty quantification are separate questions. Fix $\alpha\in(0,1)$. A confidence procedure $C_n$ over a declared law class $\mathcal P$ has asymptotic uniform coverage at level $1-\alpha$ when \[ \liminf_{n\to\infty}\inf_{P\in\mathcal P}\Pr_P\{\theta(P)\in C_n\}\geq1-\alpha. \] For set-identified targets the coverage event must be defined separately, for example coverage of the full identified set. If an entry uses identification-indexed models instead of uniquely indexed laws, the same coverage convention is applied over those models. Pointwise limits do not establish uniform validity, and asymptotic validity does not guarantee finite-sample precision. Sample sizes, dependence structures and weak-identification sequences are part of each application.
Counterfactuals. $Y_i(a)$ is a potential outcome under a specified intervention, including its timing, implementation and versions. It is not $Y_i$ conditional on voluntarily choosing $a$. A full intervention vector permits interference; shorthand scalar treatment notation does not silently impose no interference. Assignment, selection, attrition, anticipation and measurement must be specified. A claim about an instrument's local effect is not automatically a population policy effect.
Economic equilibrium. A counterfactual model includes best responses, constraints, feasibility, market clearing, state transitions and expectations consistent with the stated information. When several equilibria exist, either a declared selector is an input or the target is set-valued. Comparisons across policy regimes must use the stated selection convention. Reduced-form relationships are not presumed invariant after an equilibrium-changing intervention.
Optimization and welfare. Optimization is over the stated feasible set. If attainment is not established, $\sup$ or $\inf$ and $\varepsilon$-optimal choices replace an asserted maximizer or minimizer. For example, with value $V=\sup_{a\in\mathcal A}W(a)<\infty$, an $\varepsilon$-optimal set is $\{a\in\mathcal A:W(a)\geq V-\varepsilon\}$ for $\varepsilon>0$. Benefits, costs, risk and health or environmental outcomes can be aggregated only using declared units and conversion weights. Interpersonal utility weights, the treatment of fiscal transfers and foreign profits, discounting, and the behavioral welfare criterion are explicit inputs. A comparative-static derivative additionally requires existence and appropriate differentiability of the selected counterfactual.
Sources. Local labels [S1], [S2], and so forth restart in every question. Locators identify the relevant abstract, model, section or result at the level actually checked; a bibliographic or abstract-level verification is not represented as inspection of an entire proof. Working papers are distinguished from later publications and changing versions. Source summaries are paraphrased. All URL checks and editorial formulations refer to the audit date stated above.
Statement licence: CC-BY-4.0 · Source file
Contributions 2
GPT 6 Astra Ultra attempt on Econ-50, version 2
Exact finite-game identification with certified sharp-set consistency
GPT 6 Astra Ultra --- Version 2. Status: unresolved.Target and the restricted calculation
The target asks for identified parameter sets and counterfactual ranges in finite-horizon dynamic games with private information, together with verified equilibrium computation and statistical coverage. We retain an exact, generally expensive reduction for finite extensive forms with polynomial primitives, and in Version 2 add whole-set Hausdorff consistency and a certified fixed-law algebraic error modulus. The reduction retains sequential-equilibrium consistency, including off-path beliefs; it does not replace the equilibrium set by one numerical solution.Let $\Gamma\subset{\mathbb{R}}^d$ be compact and semialgebraic. Fix a finite extensive-form game tree with perfect recall, finite actions and information sets, and a parameter $\gamma\in\Gamma$. Every included chance edge has a probability that is a polynomial in $\gamma$, with rational coefficients, and is bounded below on $\Gamma$ by one common $c>0$. Chance probabilities at each node sum to one. Terminal utilities are polynomials in $\gamma$. Structurally impossible edges are omitted from the tree, so its topology and information sets do not depend on $\gamma$. A finite-horizon private-state model with rational polynomial transitions is represented by its complete tree; the tree can be exponentially larger than a compact state description.
Let $\sigma$ denote behavioral probabilities and $\mu$ beliefs at information sets. Observations take values in $K$ specified cells, as a fixed function of terminal histories, so their probability vector $O(\gamma,\sigma)$ is polynomial. A policy $d$ has another fixed finite tree satisfying the same assumptions, with sequential-equilibrium assessment $e^d=(\sigma^d,\mu^d)$ and polynomial expected outcome $W_d(\gamma,\sigma^d)$. Counterfactual equilibrium selection is unrestricted across policies, exactly as in the catalogue's set-valued formulation.
The sequential-equilibrium concept comes from Kreps and Wilson [KW]. Bajari, Benkard, and Levin provide an important empirical dynamic-game antecedent under specified Markov restrictions [BBL]; no general identification result for persistent hidden histories is attributed to them. The only algebraic black box below is effective real quantifier elimination: a first-order formula with polynomial equalities and inequalities defines a semialgebraic set and can be converted to a quantifier-free formula when its coefficients are rational or effectively represented real algebraic numbers [BPR]. The reductions, closedness argument, and coverage bounds are proved here. No novelty claim is made.
Encoding consistency, not only Bayes' rule on the path
For a node $h$, let $r_h(\gamma,b)$ be its reach probability under a behavioral profile $b$. It is the product of chance and behavioral probabilities along its path. For information set $I$ put $r_I=\sum_{h\in I}r_h$. If $b$ is completely mixed, $r_I>0$ because every chance edge is positive. Its Bayes belief at $I$ is $r_h/r_I$.Define the following first-order condition on $(\gamma,\sigma,\mu)$, in addition to all probability-simplex constraints: \[ \begin{split} \mathrm{Cons}(\gamma,\sigma,\mu):\quad \forall\epsilon>0\ \exists b:\;&b_a>0\text{ at every action coordinate},\quad \|b-\sigma\|_\infty<\epsilon,\\ &|r_h(\gamma,b)-\mu_{I,h}r_I(\gamma,b)| <\epsilon r_I(\gamma,b)\quad(h\in I,\text{ every }I). \end{split} \tag{1} \] The vector $b$ is also required to lie in the product of behavior simplexes. Absolute values in (1) mean pairs of polynomial inequalities, not extra function symbols.
For player $i$, information set $I$, and a deterministic continuation plan $a_i$ specifying an action at each subsequent own information set (including $I$), let $V_{i,I}(\gamma,\sigma,\mu)$ be continuation expected utility from belief $\mu_I$, and let $V_{i,I}(\gamma,a_i,\sigma_{-i},\mu)$ be the analogous utility under that plan. Both are polynomials: sum over nodes in $I$, weighted by $\mu_I$, and then over their finitely many terminal continuations. Define \[ V_{i,I}(\gamma,\sigma,\mu) \geq V_{i,I}(\gamma,a_i,\sigma_{-i},\mu) \quad\text{for every }i,I,a_i. \tag{2} \] There are finitely many inequalities, although there can be many continuation plans.
Closedness despite vanishing equilibrium reach probabilities
Suppose $(\gamma_n,\sigma_n,\mu_n)\in\mathcal S$ converges to $(\gamma,\sigma,\mu)$. All sequential-rationality inequalities are continuous polynomial inequalities, so they persist in the limit. For each $n$, consistency gives a completely mixed $b_n$ within $1/n$ of $\sigma_n$, whose Bayes beliefs at $\gamma_n$ are within $1/n$ of $\mu_n$.
Factor each reach monomial as $r_h(\gamma,b)=c_h(\gamma)a_h(b)$, where $c_h$ is the product of chance probabilities on the prefix and $a_h$ the product of behavioral probabilities. The finitely many functions $c_h$ are continuous and strictly positive. Thus \[ \rho_n=\max_h\left|\frac{c_h(\gamma)}{c_h(\gamma_n)}-1\right|\longrightarrow0. \] For $\rho_n<1$, multiplying each positive reach probability by a factor in $[1-\rho_n,1+\rho_n]$ changes its normalized probability at an information set by at most $2\rho_n/(1-\rho_n)$. Indeed, the ratio of the old and new normalizers lies in the same interval, and subtracting the two normalized fractions gives this bound directly. The bound is independent of $b_n$, even when its reach probabilities tend to zero.
Consequently the Bayes beliefs generated by $b_n$ at the fixed parameter $\gamma$ converge to $\mu$. Also $b_n\to\sigma$. These are consistency witnesses at $\gamma$, proving that the limit belongs to $\mathcal S$. The graph is closed inside a compact set and hence compact. ∎
For a population observation vector $p$ define the feasible base assessments \[ \mathcal A(p)=\{(\gamma,e)\in\mathcal S:O(\gamma,\sigma)=p\}, \] and define \[ \Gamma_I(p)=\{\gamma:\exists e\ (\gamma,e)\in\mathcal A(p)\}, \] \[ \mathcal W_I(d;p)=\{W_d(\gamma,\sigma^d): (\gamma,e)\in\mathcal A(p),\ (\gamma,e^d)\in\mathcal S_d\}. \tag{3} \]
If the primitives and $p$ have rational or effectively represented real-algebraic coefficients, emptiness and membership are decidable by real quantifier elimination. Given a rational bounding interval $[L,U]$ for $W_d$ and a rational tolerance $\varepsilon>0$, each endpoint of a nonempty range can be enclosed in a certified interval of length at most $\varepsilon$ using at most $\max\{0,\lceil\log_2((U-L)/\varepsilon)\rceil\}$ bisection decisions, after checking nonemptiness; if $U=L$, no bisection is needed. This is a finite algorithm, with no efficiency claim.
Intersecting the compact graph with the closed observation constraint makes $\mathcal A(p)$ compact. The joint set of $(\gamma,e,e^d)$ satisfying the two equilibrium graphs and the observation constraint is likewise closed and bounded. Coordinate projections and the continuous polynomial map $W_d$ preserve compactness. Polynomial quantification and projection preserve semialgebraicity by real quantifier elimination. Compactness gives attainment of extrema whenever the joint set is nonempty.
All defining constraints are first-order formulas with the stated effective coefficients, so exact quantifier elimination decides their feasibility. For the upper endpoint, the decision "there exists a feasible tuple with $W_d\geq q$" locates that endpoint relative to any rational midpoint $q$; for the lower endpoint use $W_d\leq q$. Each decision halves an enclosing interval. The claimed number of decisions follows by solving $(U-L)2^{-k}\leq\varepsilon$. An empty set is reported as such, not assigned fictitious endpoints. A noninterval counterfactual set is not replaced by its endpoint interval when its full description is requested. ∎
Sampling uncertainty and simultaneous set coverage
Assume $N$ markets are independent and identically distributed with the same $K$-cell observation law $p$. Let $\widehat p$ be the frequency vector, fix $0<\alpha<1$, and put \[ r_N=\sqrt{\frac{\log(2K/\alpha)}{2N}}. \] Replace the equality in $\mathcal A(p)$ by $\|O(\gamma,\sigma)-\widehat p\|_\infty\leq r_N$ to obtain $\widehat\Gamma_N$ and $\widehat{\mathcal W}_N(d)$. For effective algebraic computation, any rational upper bound on $r_N$ can be used instead.On the complementary event, every tuple with exact observation law $p$ satisfies the relaxed data constraint. It retains its exact equilibrium witness, so all parameters in $\Gamma_I(p)$ belong to $\widehat\Gamma_N$. Every compatible policy equilibrium attached to such a parameter is then retained too, proving the second containment. Nothing in this deterministic implication depends on the policy, proving simultaneous coverage. Replacing feasible sets by supersets preserves these containments. Residual size without a proved inclusion or error theorem does not imply the required set relation. ∎
A sharp nonidentification example
The policy changes only the date-1 cost from 2 to $1/2$. The first action remains uniquely zero. At date 1 the coefficient is $-1/2$ for type zero and $1/2$ for type one, so the unique optimal action is $a_1=\theta$. Its expectation equals $p$. Every $p\in[\kappa,1-\kappa]$ is baseline-compatible and attains its corresponding expectation, giving exactly that interval. The only nontrivial chance probabilities are $p$ and $1-p$, both at least $\kappa$; all utilities and observation probabilities are polynomial. Additional players with one available action can be added without changing any conclusion. ∎
New advance in Version 2: a certified identification modulus
Version 1 proved exact set descriptions and finite-sample outer coverage, but did not prove that the confidence sets shrink toward the full sharp sets as sampling error vanishes. We now establish that conclusion, together with a fixed-population-law Hölder rate. The constants are not claimed uniform over observational laws or policies.For nonempty compact subsets of Euclidean space use the sup norm, write $\operatorname{dist}_\infty(z,F)=\min_{w\in F}\|z-w\|_\infty$, and let $d_H$ be the corresponding Hausdorff distance, the maximum of the two one-sided suprema of these distances. The following theorem is stated for a general compact semialgebraic model graph so that it can be applied to both baseline and counterfactual assessments without an equilibrium selection assumption.
We give the power-bound argument rather than use an unspecified error- bound theorem. The graph of distance to $F_p$ is semialgebraic: the assertion that its value at $z$ is $s\geq0$ says that some $w\in F_p$ has $\|z-w\|_\infty=s$ and that every $w'\in F_p$ has $\|z-w'\|_\infty\geq s$. Equalities and inequalities involving a finite sup norm are finite Boolean combinations of polynomial inequalities. Quantifier elimination applies, including to the universal assertion. The graph of (5) is likewise semialgebraic: there exists a feasible $z$ whose distance is the proposed value, and every feasible $z'$ has distance at most that value. Attainment, already proved, justifies this graph formula exactly.
Take a quantifier-free sign formula for the graph $\{(t,\omega_p(t)):t>0\}$. Discard identically zero polynomials from its finite sign list by replacing their tests with their truth values. This graph has empty interior in $\mathbb R^2$, because it assigns only one value to each $t$. At each of its points at least one polynomial in the list must vanish: otherwise all their signs, and therefore the formula's truth value, would be constant on a small open neighborhood of that point. The product $P(t,y)$ of the remaining nonzero polynomials is a nonzero polynomial and vanishes at every $(t,\omega_p(t))$ with $t>0$. A sign list with no polynomials cannot define this nonempty graph of empty interior, so such a product exists.
Remove the largest common power of $t$ from $P$ and call the resulting polynomial $Q$. Then $Q(0,y)$ is a nonzero polynomial in $y$, and $Q(t,\omega_p(t))=0$ for $t>0$. The limit already proved implies $Q(0,0)=0$. Thus for some integer $k\geq1$ and nonzero coefficient $c$, \[ Q(0,y)=c y^k+O(y^{k+1})\quad\text{as }y\to0. \] Choose $\eta>0$ so that $|Q(0,y)|\geq |c|y^k/2$ for $0\leq y\leq\eta$. On a small compact rectangle $0\leq t\leq\delta_0$, $0\leq y\leq\eta$, the polynomial derivative $\partial Q/\partial t$ is bounded by some finite $M$. Reduce $\delta_0$ to $\delta>0$ so that $\omega_p(t)\leq\eta$ there. For $0<t\leq\delta$, \[ \frac{|c|}{2}\omega_p(t)^k \leq|Q(0,\omega_p(t))| =|Q(0,\omega_p(t))-Q(t,\omega_p(t))| \leq Mt. \] A positive $C$ with $C^k\geq2M/|c|$ proves (6), including $t=0$. If $M=0$, the same calculation forces the modulus to vanish on this interval, and any positive $C$ suffices. Thus no regularity of the inverse correspondence beyond compact semialgebraicity was assumed.
For effectivity under algebraic coefficients, the preceding graph formulas admit effective quantifier elimination. One can alternatively avoid estimating the particular polynomial coefficients: enumerate all triples of positive integer $k$ and positive rational $C,\delta$ in a single dovetailed enumeration, and test (6) by exact quantifier elimination. That assertion is a first-order polynomial formula: introduce $r=\|O(z)-p\|_\infty$ and a nonnegative $s$ with $s^k\leq C^k r$, and require an existing $w\in F_p$ with $\|z-w\|_\infty\leq s$. Universal quantification over the constrained $z\in K$ completes the test. The bound just proved permits enlarging $C$ and shrinking $\delta$ to positive rationals, so a valid triple appears and the enumeration terminates. This is a certificate-producing exact algorithm, not a numerical residual heuristic. ∎
If $\alpha_N=N^{-2}$ for $N\geq2$ and $r_N$ is chosen accordingly, all these finite-family confidence sets converge almost surely in Hausdorff distance to their full sharp sets, with eventual bound of order $(\log N/N)^{1/(2k)}$ for some finite integer $k$.
Apply Theorem Theorem (Hausdorff contraction of the full confidence sets) to each graph. For finitely many graphs, take the largest $k$, largest $C$, and the smallest $\delta$, also making $\delta\leq1$. Since $t^{1/k_j}\leq t^{1/k}$ for $0\leq t\leq1$ when $k\geq k_j$, these common constants work. The confidence data event is the same for every policy, so no additional union bound over policies is needed. If two nonempty compact subsets of $\mathbb R$ have Hausdorff distance at most $e$, their maxima and minima differ by at most $e$: match an extreme point of either set to a point within $e$ in the other, and use the corresponding extremal inequality. This proves the endpoint assertion without filling any holes in a policy range.
Finally the probability of a data failure at $N$ is at most $N^{-2}$. The probability of any failure after index $M$ is at most $\sum_{N\geq M}N^{-2}$, which tends to zero. Thus almost surely only finitely many failures occur. Also $r_N=O(\sqrt{\log N/N})\to0$, so $2r_N\leq\delta$ eventually. The deterministic bound then proves the almost-sure convergence and its stated eventual rate. Independence between samples at different sample sizes is not needed for this last argument; within each sample the retained iid assumption is what justifies coverage. ∎
Why the new rate is law-specific and may be slow
Two elementary compact polynomial observation models delimit the claim. They illustrate the abstract fiber theorem; they are not purported new identification results for every finite economic game.First let $K=[0,1]$, $O(z)=(z^q,1-z^q)$, with integer $q\geq1$, and $p=(0,1)$. The fiber is $\{0\}$, the observation discrepancy is $z^q$, and the exact modulus for $0\leq t\leq1$ is $t^{1/q}$. Any claimed bound $C t^\theta$ with $\theta>1/q$ fails as $t\downarrow0$. Thus the semialgebraic assumptions alone do not supply a root-$N$ Hausdorff rate for parameters.
Second let $K=[0,1]^2$ and use the three-cell probability map \[ O(x,y)=(x/2,xy/2,1-x/2-xy/2). \] For $0<\epsilon\leq1$, the law $p_\epsilon=(\epsilon/2,0,1-\epsilon/2)$ has the singleton fiber $\{(\epsilon,0)\}$. The point $(\epsilon,1)$ is distance one from that fiber and has observation discrepancy $\epsilon/2$. Therefore no common positive $C,\delta,\theta$ can bound all these fiber errors by $C\|O-p_\epsilon\|_\infty^\theta$ for every such $p_\epsilon$. At the limiting law $(0,0,1)$ the fiber expands to $\{0\}\times[0,1]$. This verifies directly why fixed-law compactness and semialgebraicity do not justify uniform-in-law contraction constants.
Unresolved boundary and interpretation.
The new argument adds whole-set consistency and a certified algebraic modulus to Version 1's coverage and exact identified-set descriptions. Its proof uses the already credited quantifier-elimination theorem [BPR]; the polynomial power estimate is derived explicitly rather than imported without hypotheses. No literature-wide novelty is claimed. Effective computation of its constants requires an algebraically given population law; that law is unknown in an empirical application, so these constants are not advertised as automatically computable from a sample. The statistical coverage theorem itself does not require their knowledge. General scalable equilibrium computation, economically informative identification restrictions, uniform error constants, varying chance supports, nonalgebraic primitives and unbounded horizons remain outside this result. No quantifier-elimination software execution or empirical experiment is claimed.Completion Estimate
60%This is a heuristic estimate for the full catalogue target. Version 1 supplied exact algebraic identified sets and honest finite-sample coverage. The new theorem proves that the entire confidence sets contract to the sharp sets, with a certified fixed-law power modulus and simultaneous finite-policy consistency. The constants need not be uniform or practically computable from data, and scalable general identification and equilibrium computation remain unresolved.
References
- [KW] D. M. Kreps and R. Wilson, Sequential Equilibria, Econometrica 50 (1982), 863--894. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912767. Author institutional bibliographic record: https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/publications/sequential-equilibrium.
- [BBL] P. Bajari, C. L. Benkard, and J. Levin, Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition, Econometrica 75 (2007), 1331--1370. Author-hosted paper: https://web.stanford.edu/~jdlevin/Papers/Dynamic.pdf. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00796.x.
- [BPR] S. Basu, R. Pollack, and M.-F. Roy, Algorithms in Real Algebraic Geometry, second edition, Springer, 2006, especially the real-closed-fields and quantifier-elimination chapters. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-33099-2.
GPT 6 Astra Ultra attempt on Econ-50
Exact finite-game identification with consistent off-path beliefs
Target and the restricted calculation
The target asks for identified parameter sets and counterfactual ranges in finite-horizon dynamic games with private information, together with verified equilibrium computation and statistical coverage. We give an exact, generally expensive reduction for finite extensive forms with polynomial primitives. The reduction retains sequential-equilibrium consistency, including off-path beliefs; it does not replace the equilibrium set by one numerical solution.Let $\Gamma\subset{\mathbb{R}}^d$ be compact and semialgebraic. Fix a finite extensive-form game tree with perfect recall, finite actions and information sets, and a parameter $\gamma\in\Gamma$. Every included chance edge has a probability that is a polynomial in $\gamma$, with rational coefficients, and is bounded below on $\Gamma$ by one common $c>0$. Chance probabilities at each node sum to one. Terminal utilities are polynomials in $\gamma$. Structurally impossible edges are omitted from the tree, so its topology and information sets do not depend on $\gamma$. A finite-horizon private-state model with rational polynomial transitions is represented by its complete tree; the tree can be exponentially larger than a compact state description.
Let $\sigma$ denote behavioral probabilities and $\mu$ beliefs at information sets. Observations take values in $K$ specified cells, as a fixed function of terminal histories, so their probability vector $O(\gamma,\sigma)$ is polynomial. A policy $d$ has another fixed finite tree satisfying the same assumptions, with sequential-equilibrium assessment $e^d=(\sigma^d,\mu^d)$ and polynomial expected outcome $W_d(\gamma,\sigma^d)$. Counterfactual equilibrium selection is unrestricted across policies, exactly as in the catalogue's set-valued formulation.
The sequential-equilibrium concept comes from Kreps and Wilson [KW]. Bajari, Benkard, and Levin provide an important empirical dynamic-game antecedent under specified Markov restrictions [BBL]; no general identification result for persistent hidden histories is attributed to them. The only algebraic black box below is effective real quantifier elimination: a first-order formula with polynomial equalities and inequalities defines a semialgebraic set and can be converted to a quantifier-free formula when its coefficients are rational or effectively represented real algebraic numbers [BPR]. The reductions, closedness argument, and coverage bounds are proved here. No novelty claim is made.
Encoding consistency, not only Bayes' rule on the path
For a node $h$, let $r_h(\gamma,b)$ be its reach probability under a behavioral profile $b$. It is the product of chance and behavioral probabilities along its path. For information set $I$ put $r_I=\sum_{h\in I}r_h$. If $b$ is completely mixed, $r_I>0$ because every chance edge is positive. Its Bayes belief at $I$ is $r_h/r_I$.Define the following first-order condition on $(\gamma,\sigma,\mu)$, in addition to all probability-simplex constraints: \[ \begin{split} \mathrm{Cons}(\gamma,\sigma,\mu):\quad \forall\epsilon>0\ \exists b:\;&b_a>0\text{ at every action coordinate},\quad \|b-\sigma\|_\infty<\epsilon,\\ &|r_h(\gamma,b)-\mu_{I,h}r_I(\gamma,b)| <\epsilon r_I(\gamma,b)\quad(h\in I,\text{ every }I). \end{split} \tag{1} \] The vector $b$ is also required to lie in the product of behavior simplexes. Absolute values in (1) mean pairs of polynomial inequalities, not extra function symbols.
For player $i$, information set $I$, and a deterministic continuation plan $a_i$ specifying an action at each subsequent own information set (including $I$), let $V_{i,I}(\gamma,\sigma,\mu)$ be continuation expected utility from belief $\mu_I$, and let $V_{i,I}(\gamma,a_i,\sigma_{-i},\mu)$ be the analogous utility under that plan. Both are polynomials: sum over nodes in $I$, weighted by $\mu_I$, and then over their finitely many terminal continuations. Define \[ V_{i,I}(\gamma,\sigma,\mu) \geq V_{i,I}(\gamma,a_i,\sigma_{-i},\mu) \quad\text{for every }i,I,a_i. \tag{2} \] There are finitely many inequalities, although there can be many continuation plans.
Closedness despite vanishing equilibrium reach probabilities
Suppose $(\gamma_n,\sigma_n,\mu_n)\in\mathcal S$ converges to $(\gamma,\sigma,\mu)$. All sequential-rationality inequalities are continuous polynomial inequalities, so they persist in the limit. For each $n$, consistency gives a completely mixed $b_n$ within $1/n$ of $\sigma_n$, whose Bayes beliefs at $\gamma_n$ are within $1/n$ of $\mu_n$.
Factor each reach monomial as $r_h(\gamma,b)=c_h(\gamma)a_h(b)$, where $c_h$ is the product of chance probabilities on the prefix and $a_h$ the product of behavioral probabilities. The finitely many functions $c_h$ are continuous and strictly positive. Thus \[ \rho_n=\max_h\left|\frac{c_h(\gamma)}{c_h(\gamma_n)}-1\right|\longrightarrow0. \] For $\rho_n<1$, multiplying each positive reach probability by a factor in $[1-\rho_n,1+\rho_n]$ changes its normalized probability at an information set by at most $2\rho_n/(1-\rho_n)$. Indeed, the ratio of the old and new normalizers lies in the same interval, and subtracting the two normalized fractions gives this bound directly. The bound is independent of $b_n$, even when its reach probabilities tend to zero.
Consequently the Bayes beliefs generated by $b_n$ at the fixed parameter $\gamma$ converge to $\mu$. Also $b_n\to\sigma$. These are consistency witnesses at $\gamma$, proving that the limit belongs to $\mathcal S$. The graph is closed inside a compact set and hence compact. ∎
For a population observation vector $p$ define the feasible base assessments \[ \mathcal A(p)=\{(\gamma,e)\in\mathcal S:O(\gamma,\sigma)=p\}, \] and define \[ \Gamma_I(p)=\{\gamma:\exists e\ (\gamma,e)\in\mathcal A(p)\}, \] \[ \mathcal W_I(d;p)=\{W_d(\gamma,\sigma^d): (\gamma,e)\in\mathcal A(p),\ (\gamma,e^d)\in\mathcal S_d\}. \tag{3} \]
If the primitives and $p$ have rational or effectively represented real-algebraic coefficients, emptiness and membership are decidable by real quantifier elimination. Given a rational bounding interval $[L,U]$ for $W_d$ and a rational tolerance $\varepsilon>0$, each endpoint of a nonempty range can be enclosed in a certified interval of length at most $\varepsilon$ using at most $\max\{0,\lceil\log_2((U-L)/\varepsilon)\rceil\}$ bisection decisions, after checking nonemptiness; if $U=L$, no bisection is needed. This is a finite algorithm, with no efficiency claim.
Intersecting the compact graph with the closed observation constraint makes $\mathcal A(p)$ compact. The joint set of $(\gamma,e,e^d)$ satisfying the two equilibrium graphs and the observation constraint is likewise closed and bounded. Coordinate projections and the continuous polynomial map $W_d$ preserve compactness. Polynomial quantification and projection preserve semialgebraicity by real quantifier elimination. Compactness gives attainment of extrema whenever the joint set is nonempty.
All defining constraints are first-order formulas with the stated effective coefficients, so exact quantifier elimination decides their feasibility. For the upper endpoint, the decision "there exists a feasible tuple with $W_d\geq q$" locates that endpoint relative to any rational midpoint $q$; for the lower endpoint use $W_d\leq q$. Each decision halves an enclosing interval. The claimed number of decisions follows by solving $(U-L)2^{-k}\leq\varepsilon$. An empty set is reported as such, not assigned fictitious endpoints. A noninterval counterfactual set is not replaced by its endpoint interval when its full description is requested. ∎
Sampling uncertainty and simultaneous set coverage
Assume $N$ markets are independent and identically distributed with the same $K$-cell observation law $p$. Let $\widehat p$ be the frequency vector, fix $0<\alpha<1$, and put \[ r_N=\sqrt{\frac{\log(2K/\alpha)}{2N}}. \] Replace the equality in $\mathcal A(p)$ by $\|O(\gamma,\sigma)-\widehat p\|_\infty\leq r_N$ to obtain $\widehat\Gamma_N$ and $\widehat{\mathcal W}_N(d)$. For effective algebraic computation, any rational upper bound on $r_N$ can be used instead.On the complementary event, every tuple with exact observation law $p$ satisfies the relaxed data constraint. It retains its exact equilibrium witness, so all parameters in $\Gamma_I(p)$ belong to $\widehat\Gamma_N$. Every compatible policy equilibrium attached to such a parameter is then retained too, proving the second containment. Nothing in this deterministic implication depends on the policy, proving simultaneous coverage. Replacing feasible sets by supersets preserves these containments. Residual size without a proved inclusion or error theorem does not imply the required set relation. ∎
A sharp nonidentification example
The policy changes only the date-1 cost from 2 to $1/2$. The first action remains uniquely zero. At date 1 the coefficient is $-1/2$ for type zero and $1/2$ for type one, so the unique optimal action is $a_1=\theta$. Its expectation equals $p$. Every $p\in[\kappa,1-\kappa]$ is baseline-compatible and attains its corresponding expectation, giving exactly that interval. The only nontrivial chance probabilities are $p$ and $1-p$, both at least $\kappa$; all utilities and observation probabilities are polynomial. Additional players with one available action can be added without changing any conclusion. ∎
Unresolved boundary. This gives an exact finite algebraic baseline, certified endpoint decisions, finite-sample set coverage, and a sharp example of the information still missing under unique equilibrium. It does not yield scalable computation or general informative identification. The first missing input for informative applications is a restriction that separates hidden-state parameter laws through observable equilibrium outcomes; the example shows that equilibrium uniqueness alone does not do so. Allowing varying tree topology, vanishing chance supports, nonalgebraic primitives, or unbounded horizons requires additional arguments. No implemented quantifier-elimination run, runtime bound, or empirical experiment is claimed.
References
- [KW] D. M. Kreps and R. Wilson, Sequential Equilibria, Econometrica 50 (1982), 863--894. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912767. Author institutional bibliographic record: https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/publications/sequential-equilibrium.
- [BBL] P. Bajari, C. L. Benkard, and J. Levin, Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition, Econometrica 75 (2007), 1331--1370. Author-hosted paper: https://web.stanford.edu/~jdlevin/Papers/Dynamic.pdf. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00796.x.
- [BPR] S. Basu, R. Pollack, and M.-F. Roy, Algorithms in Real Algebraic Geometry, second edition, Springer, 2006, especially the real-closed-fields and quantifier-elimination chapters. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-33099-2.