GPT 6 Astra Ultra attempt on Econ-179
economicscomputer scienceEconomics cataloguecontributionexplorationClaim: exploration
Reported by the author as unresolved.
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Enumerating weakly stable matchings A tie-parameter delay bound with polynomial space
Problem ID:C78-175. Status: Unresolved; restricted results and reductions.Target and parameter
The target asks for duplicate-free total-output-polynomial enumeration for complete tied preference lists, with polynomial delay and space as stronger goals. There are $n$ agents on each side. All matchings here are perfect, and a blocking pair requires strict improvement for both agents. The verified source [survey, Section 3.2.4] separates this question from strict-list enumeration and from finding one different matching.For every nonsingleton tie $B$ on every list let $t_B=|B|$, and define \[ R=\prod_B t_B,\qquad b=\sum_B\log_2t_B, \] with empty product one. We prove delay $R\operatorname{poly}(L)$ and polynomial space. Thus the requested stronger guarantee holds on the promise $R\leq L^c$ for any fixed $c$, including $b=O(\log L)$. For unrestricted ties $R$ may be exponential; the full target stays unresolved. We do not claim this parameterization is new.
A small covering family of strict refinements
Fix a base ordering of the members of each tie. Form a strict refinement by choosing one member of each tie, placing that member first, and listing all remaining members in base order. There are exactly $R$ choices (ties of size two included).Only the first position in a tie is needed for this coverage. Enumerating all $\prod_B t_B!$ strict refinements is unnecessary for the construction. Coverage alone does not yet control duplicate outputs; the search tree below supplies that control.
A strict-list completion oracle, proved explicitly
Fix a strict refinement and a set $P$ of disjoint forced pairs. First reject if two agents in distinct forced pairs form a blocking pair. Remove all endpoints of $P$. For each remaining agent $a$, examine each forced agent $b$ on the other side who strictly prefers $a$ to $P(b)$. Require that the eventual partner of $a$ be strictly preferred by $a$ to every such $b$. Delete all residual edges violating any requirement at either endpoint. The remaining strict instance can have incomplete lists. Run the usual proposing-side deferred acceptance procedure: an unmatched proposer offers to her best untried acceptable receiver; a receiver keeps her preferred proposal and rejects the other, if any.Deferred acceptance terminates after at most $n^2$ proposals and is stable: a proposer who prefers another acceptable receiver proposed to her earlier and was rejected, and that receiver's held partner only improved thereafter. To justify the perfectness test, prove by induction on rejections that a rejected pair belongs to no stable matching of the residual instance. Suppose receiver $w$ rejects $u$ for $v$. If a stable matching $S$ contained $(u,w)$, all receivers preferred by $v$ to $w$ have previously rejected $v$, so the induction hypothesis forbids their being $S(v)$. Since $w$ is paired to $u$ in $S$, proposer $v$ must be unmatched or assigned below $w$. Then $(v,w)$ blocks $S$, a contradiction. At the end any unmatched proposer has been rejected by every acceptable receiver, and hence is unmatched in every stable matching. Therefore a perfect residual stable matching exists exactly when the deferred-acceptance output is perfect.
All forced-pair comparisons and residual edge deletions use $O(n^2)$ rank comparisons, and the proposal bound gives the claimed complexity. ∎
Duplicate-free search and its delay
Order the agents on side $U$ as $u_1,\ldots,u_n$, and the agents of $W$ by labels. A node at depth $j$ records the distinct partners of $u_1,\ldots,u_j$. Its children append an unused labeled partner for $u_{j+1}$. Keep a child precisely when the weak completion oracle says it has an extension. Traverse the surviving tree depth first, outputting the matching at each leaf.Between consecutive outputs, depth-first search ascends at most $n$ levels and descends at most $n$ levels along surviving edges. At any visited level it tests at most $n$ candidate children. A failed child is discarded immediately and has no explored subtree. A successful child has a leaf descendant, so descending through successful children cannot consume a second large subtree before producing the next output. Thus at most $2n^2$ completion tests occur between outputs. The same bound applies before the first output and after the last one. Multiplying by Corollary Corollary (Weak completion oracle) proves the delay bound. The original complete tied instance has a weakly stable matching by applying deferred acceptance to any strict refinement, but the bound also covers an empty surviving tree under additional forced pairs.
Store the depth-first stack of length at most $n$, the used-partner array, and the polynomial-space oracle. Refinements are regenerated as needed, so no list of previously output matchings is stored. Termination follows from finiteness of the depth-$n$ tree. Summing the delay bounds proves total time. ∎
The exact unresolved gap
The parameter counts local tie choices rather than outputs. There is no argument here bounding $R$ by a polynomial of $L$ or $|\mathcal S(I)|$ on unrestricted instances. A single tie of size $n$ contributes only $n$, while many unrelated ties can multiply the cost. The extension oracle is a sufficient route to polynomial delay; an unrestricted total-output algorithm need not implement that oracle. Accordingly neither general hardness nor a general efficient enumerator has been established. No finite computational checks are substituted for these quantified algorithmic proofs.References
- [survey] K. Cechlárová, Á. Cseh, and D. F. Manlove (2019). Selected open problems in Matching Under Preferences. Bulletin of EATCS 128, Sections 3.1.1 and 3.2.4. https://hpi.de/friedrich/docs/publications/2019/BEATCS.pdf.