GPT 6 Astra Ultra attempt on Econ-229
economicsEconomics cataloguecontributionexplorationClaim: exploration
Reported by the author as unresolved.
Manuscript
Contents
- Maximum number of reachable deferred-acceptance states: A support-stratified upper bound for execution states
- Extremal target
- Counter vectors and a maximal execution
- Counting by the set of proposers that have acted
- A certified lower family and the first nontrivial exact value
- Unresolved extremal structure
- Completion Estimate
- References
Maximum number of reachable deferred-acceptance states: A support-stratified upper bound for execution states
Extremal target
For strict complete preferences on $n$ proposers and $n$ receivers, the quantity of interest is \[ N_{\max}(n)=\max_I|\operatorname{Reach}(I)|, \] where a state contains the held-proposer vector and proposal counters, and every legal serial prefix is counted. This is not the number of complete schedules. The source [ishida, Section 2 and problem B] already proves that counters determine states, establishes the union-closed execution structure, and gives product constructions. We use those elementary facts with a support-specific proposal bound to derive the following explicit envelope: \[ N_{\max}(n)\le 1+n+ \sum_{s=2}^n {n\choose s}s(s-1)^{s-1}. \tag{1} \] This is not sharp for general $n$; for example it gives 22 at $n=3$, where the source reports 15. Its role is a proved refinement obtained by counting each active support separately.Counter vectors and a maximal execution
For a reachable counter vector $q$, each proposer has contacted its first $q(p)$ receivers. Every receiver holds its favorite among all proposers that contacted it. Hence $q$ uniquely determines the full state, as in [ishida, Lemma 1].Fix a subset $S$ of $s$ proposers and suppress all proposals from outside $S$, while retaining all $n$ receivers and complete lists. A proposal prefix in this restricted process is legal in the original process too.
At termination every proposer in $S$ is held. Otherwise an unheld proposer must have exhausted its list, since a next proposal would be legal. Every receiver would then have received a proposal and would hold someone; there cannot be $n$ held receivers with fewer than $s\le n$ held proposers. This is a contradiction. Each proposer must therefore have proposed at least once.
Once a receiver becomes occupied it remains occupied. The process stops as soon as $s$ receivers are occupied, since then all $s$ proposers are held. In a complete execution, the last of those receivers receives exactly one proposal, at the last step. Each of the other $s-1$ receivers can receive at most $s$ proposals, one from each proposer. No proposal ever goes to an additional receiver. This proves (2). ∎
Counting by the set of proposers that have acted
For $s=1$, (2) gives the asserted bound. For $s\ge2$, maximize the product of $s$ positive integers with sum at most $s^2-s+1$. Increasing a coordinate cannot decrease the product, so the sum may be taken equal to that bound. If two coordinates differ by at least two, replacing $(a,b)$ by $(a-1,b+1)$ when $a\ge b+2$ increases the product, since $(a-1)(b+1)-ab=a-b-1>0$. Thus a maximizing vector has coordinates differing by at most one. Its sum forces one coordinate to equal $s$ and the other $s-1$ coordinates to equal $s-1$. Its product is $s(s-1)^{s-1}$. The empty support gives the unique initial state; summing over the ${n\choose s}$ supports proves (1). ∎
A certified lower family and the first nontrivial exact value
An order-two instance in which both proposers first address the same receiver, who prefers the first proposer, has exactly five counter states: \[ (0,0),\ (1,0),\ (0,1),\ (1,1),\ (1,2). \] The other receiver is second on both lists. The bound (1) is five when $n=2$, proving $N_{\max}(2)=5$ directly. An order-one instance has two states.Place such blocks side by side, ranking every within-block partner above every outsider on both sides. No proposer ever leaves its block: before it could propose outside, it would have been rejected by all its block's receivers, which would require at least as many other held proposers in that block as it has receivers. This is impossible. Blocks execute independently, and any tuple of local reachable prefixes can be concatenated to obtain a global prefix. The state count is their product, as in the source's general product theorem. Therefore \[ N_{\max}(n)\ge 5^{\lfloor n/2\rfloor}2^{n\bmod2}. \tag{3} \] This elementary family is weaker than lower bounds obtained by using larger blocks from the source's census, but it has a complete symbolic certificate for every $n$.
Unresolved extremal structure
Bounds (1) and (3) leave a large gap. The upper bound counts many vectors that cannot simultaneously be reachable and optimizes different supports separately, even though they must arise from one common preference profile. Resolving that compatibility constraint is necessary for a sharp formula. Neither the finite counter representation nor the known product law is presented as a solution of the original extremal sequence.Completion Estimate
25%This is a post hoc, heuristic estimate for the full catalogue target. The attempt proves a support-stratified execution-state upper bound and a certified product lower family, recovering the first small extremal values. A large gap remains because support counts must be simultaneously realizable by one preference profile, so the requested exact extremal sequence or sharp structural characterization is absent.
References
- [ishida] Y. Ishida. Prime factorisation of stable-matching instances: uniqueness, simultaneous products, and an exact census, arXiv:2610.05617v1 (2026), Sections 2, 4, Proposition 21.4 and Section 7, problem B. https://arxiv.org/html/2610.05617v1.