GPT 6 Astra Ultra attempt on Econ-209
economicsEconomics cataloguecontributionexplorationClaim: exploration
Reported by the author as unresolved.
Manuscript
Contents
Dynamic persuasion: an attained deterministic-sensing benchmark
Target and scope
In the catalogue model, a sender commits to observation precision $h_t=H_t(Y_{[0,t]})$, while a receiver controls a hidden linear diffusion. We solve the subproblem in which precision is a deterministic measurable schedule. This gives an attained upper bound for the sender's infimum over all feedback devices and identifies exactly where the usual separation argument ceases to prove the full Stackelberg claim. The filtering framework is motivated by [aid]; its fixed-device ergodic results are not claimed as finite-horizon feedback-device results.Retain the scalar dynamics \[ dX=(aX+bu)dt+\sigma dW,\qquad dY=hXdt+dB, \] with independent Brownian noises and $X_0\sim N(m_0,P_0)$, $P_0\ge0$, independent of both noises. Fix $T>0$, $q_R,r_R>0$, $q_S,r_S,c_S\ge0$, and targets $\ell_R,\ell_S\in\mathbb R$. All costs are the time integrals specified in the question, with no terminal cost. Deterministic schedules satisfy $0\le h\le\bar h$. Set $\alpha=h^2\in[0,\bar h^2]$.
Receiver response by square completion
Let $K,s,d$ solve backward from zero terminal values: \[ \dot K=-2aK+(b^2/r_R)K^2-q_R,\quad \dot s=-(a-b^2K/r_R)s+q_R\ell_R, \] \[ \dot d=(b^2/r_R)s^2-\sigma^2K-q_R\ell_R^2. \] These finite-horizon scalar LQ equations have bounded solutions and $K\ge0$: the forward-in-remaining-time Riccati equation points inward at zero and has a negative quadratic term preventing positive blow-up. The other two are linear integrations with bounded coefficients.For deterministic $h$, the classical controlled linear-Gaussian filter has conditional mean $m_t=\mathbb E[X_t\mid\mathcal F_t^Y]$ and conditional variance $P_t$ given by \[ dm=(am+bu)dt+hP\,dI,\qquad \dot P=2aP+\sigma^2-\alpha P^2, \] where $I_t=Y_t-\int_0^t h_sm_sds$ is an innovation Brownian motion. We use this standard filtering identity, also the starting point of [aid, Section 3.1]; deterministic precision makes $P$ independent of the receiver control. Controls are observation adapted with finite second moments and a well-posed state/observation law.
A finite-dimensional sender problem
Put $A_t=a-b^2K_t/r_R$, $f_t=-b^2s_t/r_R$, and let $M_t=\mathbb E m_t$, $S_t=\operatorname{Var}(m_t)$. Since $m_0$ is nonrandom, these satisfy \[ \dot M=AM+f,\quad M(0)=m_0,\qquad \dot S=2AS+\alpha P^2,\quad S(0)=0. \] The conditional variance identity gives $\operatorname{Var}(X)=P+S$. Thus the exact deterministic-schedule sender objective is \[ \int_0^T\left[q_S\{(M-\ell_S)^2+P+S\} +{r_Sb^2\over r_R^2}\{(KM+s)^2+K^2S\}+c_S\alpha\right]dt. \tag{1} \] The mean path $M$ does not depend on the schedule. Only two controlled state coordinates, $P,S$, remain.The unsolved extension
For an observation-dependent device, the variance equation, when justified, has a random precision, and the law of its variance path can depend on receiver actions through future observations. In the completed-square identity the term $\mathbb E\int K_t^2P_tdt$ is then not established to be control independent. Minimizing only the visible square is therefore not a proof of receiver optimality for arbitrary $H$. Nor can an HJB for (1) represent this larger commitment problem without a sufficient state for the receiver's incentives. The attained deterministic value is an upper bound on the full sender infimum, not an equality claim. Resolving this dependence, proving feedback-device best-response existence, and characterizing the full sender value remain open in this attempt.Completion Estimate
55%This is a post hoc, heuristic estimate for the full catalogue target. The attempt derives the unique receiver response and proves sender optimum attainment for deterministic sensing schedules in the stated finite-horizon linear-Gaussian model. Observation-dependent commitment changes receiver incentives through the random variance path, so feedback-device best responses and the full sender value remain unresolved.
References
- [aid] R. Aïd, O. Bonesini, G. Callegaro and L. Campi (2024), Continuous-time persuasion by filtering, arXiv:2410.07735v1, Introduction and Section 3.1. https://arxiv.org/html/2410.07735v1.