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A most-probably rank-maximal house allocation: NP-completeness for explicit joint lotteries, FPT in the support size
Abstract
For the explicit joint-distribution encoding, deciding whether some matching is rank-maximal with probability at least $\tau$ is NP-complete. This holds even with strict lists of length two, a uniform distribution, and a support of size $2|E|$ for a MAX-CUT instance $(V,E)$. Consequently, computing $M^*$ is NP-hard. The problem is solvable in time $2^K\mathrm{poly}(|I|)$ when the support has $K$ profiles, by intersecting optimal faces of the matching polytope. For both independent encodings, we show that instances decomposing into acceptable-pair components are solved componentwise in polynomial time, and that the general threshold problems lie in $\mathrm{NP}^{\mathrm{PP}}$. Hardness for the independent encodings is left open.1. Lexicographic weights
Let $R$ be the maximal list length and $n=|A|$. Give an edge of applicant rank $r$ the weight $\omega(r)=(n+1)^{R-r}$. Since at most $n$ edges share a rank, the lexicographic order of signatures coincides with the order of total weight. Thus the rank-maximal matchings of $P$ are exactly the maximum-$\omega_P$-weight matchings [ikmmp]. Testing whether a given $M$ is rank-maximal for $P$ takes polynomial time.Lemma (Additivity over components): Suppose $E$ is a disjoint union of components $E_1,\dots,E_q$ (no applicant or house shared). Then $M$ is rank-maximal for $P$ iff each $M\cap E_c$ is rank-maximal for the restriction of $P$ to $E_c$.
Proof: Signatures add over components, and $(\mathbb Z^R,+,\le_{\rm lex})$ is an ordered group. A strict improvement in one component, with the others fixed, strictly improves the sum. Conversely, componentwise maxima maximise the sum. ∎
2. NP-completeness for explicit joint lotteries
Theorem: With an explicitly listed lottery over complete profiles, deciding $\max_M\Pr_P\{M\text{ rank-maximal for }P\}\ge\tau$ is NP-complete, even when all lists are strict of length $2$ and the lottery is uniform.
Proof: Membership. Guess $M$, test rank-maximality at each support profile, and add the weights.
Selecting $M^*$ is therefore NP-hard, and $M^*$ yields a maximum cut. The reduction is approximation-preserving up to the factor $2|E|$, so constant-factor inapproximability thresholds for MAX-CUT transfer to the optimisation version.Hardness. Reduce from MAX-CUT. For a graph $(V,E)$, create for each $v\in V$ a block with applicants $a_v,a'_v$ and houses $h_v,h'_v$, all four pairs acceptable. Its two perfect matchings are $\mathsf A_v=\{a_vh_v,a'_vh'_v\}$ and $\mathsf B_v=\{a_vh'_v,a'_vh_v\}$. A profile can treat block $v$ in three ways:
- force $\mathsf A_v$: $a_v:h_v\succ h'_v$ and $a'_v:h'_v\succ h_v$; the signature is $(2,0)$ for $\mathsf A_v$ and $(0,2)$ for $\mathsf B_v$;
- force $\mathsf B_v$: the mirror image;
- free: both applicants rank $h_v\succ h'_v$; both perfect matchings have signature $(1,1)$, and every non-perfect block matching is lexicographically smaller.
3. Tractable regimes
Proposition (FPT in the support size): With $K$ support profiles, $\max_M\Pr$ can be computed in time $2^K\mathrm{poly}(|I|)$.
Proof: For $S\subseteq[K]$, let $\mathcal R_S=\bigcap_{j\in S}\mathcal R(P_j)$, where $\mathcal R(P_j)$ is the set of rank-maximal matchings of $P_j$. Each $\mathcal R(P_j)$ is the vertex set of the face of the matching polytope maximising $\omega_{P_j}$. Compute $\mu_j=\max\omega_{P_j}$ and any $M_S\in\arg\max_M\sum_{j\in S}\omega_{P_j}(M)$. If $\mathcal R_S\ne\varnothing$, then the optimum equals $\sum_{j\in S}\mu_j$, and it is attained exactly on $\mathcal R_S$. So $\mathcal R_S\ne\varnothing$ iff $\omega_{P_j}(M_S)=\mu_j$ for all $j\in S$. The answer is the maximum weight of a feasible $S$, with $M_S$ as a witness. ∎
Proposition (Independent encodings on separated instances): Under independent lotteries or independent uniform tie refinements, suppose no applicant's support orders link two acceptable-pair components. Then the probability is a product over components, by Lemma Lemma (Additivity over components) and independence. Each component is optimised separately, and is polynomial when each component has $O(\log|I|)$ applicants.
Proposition (Upper bounds): For both independent encodings, the threshold problem lies in $\mathrm{NP}^{\mathrm{PP}}$. Guess $M$; the probability of rank-maximality is a ratio of a GapP-computable count to an explicit denominator, because each profile choice is checkable in polynomial time.
4. What remains, and a possible route
The joint encoding's hardness exploits correlation across blocks. Independent encodings destroy this correlation on separated instances. We conjecture NP-hardness nonetheless. A route is a single random selector applicant $\sigma$ whose $j$-th listed order makes a house $q_j$ its first choice. If the deterministic remainder can be arranged so that $\sigma$'s switch to $q_j$ yields a lexicographically improving alternating path exactly when block $u_j$ or block $v_j$ is in a forbidden state, then $\Pr$ simulates the joint lottery. Lemma Lemma (Additivity over components) shows that this requires non-separated gadgets. We have not completed such a gadget, and evaluation hardness of $\Pr\{M\text{ rank-maximal}\}$ in the independent encodings is also open.Completion Estimate
62%This is a post hoc, heuristic estimate for the full catalogue target. A MAX-CUT construction proves explicit joint-support completeness and a support-size algorithm intersects optimal matching faces. Independent-lottery and tie-refinement hardness and bounded-uncertainty classifications remain open, and the logarithmic-component polynomial claim needs tighter enumeration bounds.
References
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