Econ-373 · economics · computer science · Computational economics

Econ-373 · CS-886

Parameterized computation of a reachable Pareto-optimal allocation

LLM status Open unverified

C78 — Bargaining Theory - Matching Theory Economics catalogue anthropicopenaiclaude opus 5.5 highgpt 6 astra ultra 53%62% cataloguednot recordedOpen

Statement

MM-11 |  Matching markets and allocation

Research agenda formalization

Definitions and assumptions

There are $n$ applicants $A$, $n$ houses $H$, a social network $G=(A,F)$, an acceptable bijective endowment $M_0$, and strict applicant preferences. A swap is legal precisely when its applicants are adjacent and both strictly prefer the exchanged house. Let $\mathcal R_G(M_0)$ be all allocations obtainable through finite legal-swap sequences, including $M_0$. A reachable allocation $M$ is Pareto optimal relative to this set if \[ \forall N\in\mathcal R_G(M_0),\quad \left[\forall a\in A,\ N(a)\succeq_a M(a)\right] \Longrightarrow \left[\forall a\in A,\ N(a)=M(a)\right]. \] Strict preferences make the equality formulation equivalent to the absence of a strict Pareto improvement.

Formal question

Determine parameters $\kappa(I)$ for which one can output such an $M$, together with a legal sequence reaching it, in time $f(\kappa(I))|I|^c$. Establish parameterized hardness for the corresponding search task or suitably specified decision formulations where appropriate. Candidate parameters include treewidth, maximum list length, and the number of applicants permitted to exchange their houses.

Scope and status

The source proposes parameterized study of finding reachable Pareto-optimal allocations and records hardness even on trees. Thus treewidth alone cannot yield an FPT algorithm for this exact task unless the underlying classical hardness collapses: instances of treewidth one already form a hard class. Greedily continuing improving swaps until none is possible only produces a local terminal allocation; another branch from $M_0$ may produce a Pareto-superior reachable allocation. The global reachable-set definition is essential. Every finite reachable set has a Pareto-optimal member, so the obstacle concerns computation, not existence. The specific parameter combinations above are formalized research directions, with source-dated status.

References for the source of the problem

Katarína Cechlárová, Ágnes Cseh, and David F. Manlove (2019), Selected open problems in Matching Under Preferences, Section 3.1.3, the reachable-set Pareto definition, Theorem 6 and concluding paragraph: https://hpi.de/friedrich/docs/publications/2019/BEATCS.pdf. Laurent Gourvès, Julien Lesca, and Anaëlle Wilczynski (2017), Object Allocation via Swaps along a Social Network, IJCAI 2017: https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/31.

Common conventions: Source mathematical conventions

Well-defined objects. All probability spaces and measurable variables are specified or inherited from a local statistical model. Expectations used as finite targets require the stated integrability. A decision rule or estimator is measurable with respect to its available information; randomized rules may use an auxiliary independent random variable. Norms without a subscript are Euclidean in finite-dimensional spaces. An optimizer is requested only when attainment is assured; otherwise the question concerns the optimal value and $\varepsilon$-optimal admissible rules for every $\varepsilon>0$.

Identification. A structural model $m\in\mathcal M$ implies an observable law $P_m^{\rm obs}$ and target $\theta(m)$. The target is point identified on $\mathcal M$ if \[ P_{m_1}^{\rm obs}=P_{m_2}^{\rm obs} \quad\Longrightarrow\quad\theta(m_1)=\theta(m_2) \qquad(m_1,m_2\in\mathcal M). \] When this fails, the sharp identified set is \[ \Theta(P;\mathcal M)=\{\theta(m):m\in\mathcal M, P_m^{\rm obs}=P\}. \] Specifying an intervention or estimand does not establish identification. Positivity, exclusion, causal sufficiency, measurement restrictions, and transport assumptions are substantive local inputs, never automatic consequences of notation.

Minimax risk and nontrivial inference. For a statistical experiment with data law $P^{(n)}$, target $\theta(P)$, and nonnegative loss $\ell$, define \[ \mathcal R_n(\mathcal P,\ell) =\inf_{\widehat\theta_n}\sup_{P\in\mathcal P} \E_{P^{(n)}}\ell(\widehat\theta_n,\theta(P)). \] The infimum is over measurable estimators. A sharp rate is a sequence $r_n$ for which $0<c\leq C<\infty$, independent of $n$, satisfies $c r_n\leq\mathcal R_n\leq C r_n$ for all sufficiently large $n$. Squared-error parametric risk is of order $n^{-1}$; the corresponding root-mean-squared error is of order $n^{-1/2}$. These different conventions are distinguished locally. A uniform asymptotic confidence region $C_n$ must satisfy \[ \liminf_{n\to\infty}\inf_{P\in\mathcal P} \Pr_{P^{(n)}}\{\theta(P)\in C_n\}\geq 1-\alpha, \qquad 0<\alpha<1, \] together with an informative diameter or expected-width requirement. Coverage alone permits the vacuous whole parameter space. Testing questions similarly impose both size control and power against a declared separated alternative class.

Binary causal baseline. When an entry explicitly invokes this baseline, one observes independent copies of $O=(X,W,Y)$, with $W\in\{0,1\}$ and potential outcomes $Y(0),Y(1)$. Assume consistency $Y=Y(W)$, no interference, conditional exchangeability $(Y(0),Y(1))\perp W\mid X$, and overlap $\epsilon\leq e(X)\leq1-\epsilon$ almost surely for a fixed $0<\epsilon<1/2$, where \[ e(x)=\Pr(W=1\mid X=x),\qquad m_w(x)=\E[Y\mid W=w,X=x],\qquad \tau(x)=m_1(x)-m_0(x). \] These assumptions identify conditional mean effects almost everywhere under the covariate law. Pointwise or uniform effects require appropriate regularity and a specified support. Continuous treatment, longitudinal data, adaptive experiments, and network interference require their own assumptions in place of this baseline. Bounded outcomes, densities, and smoothness are additional assumptions only where stated.

Function classes. On $[0,1]^d$, $\mathcal H_d^s(L)$ is the isotropic Hölder ball of radius $L>0$: put $k=\lceil s\rceil-1$ and $\gamma=s-k\in(0,1]$, bound derivatives through order $k$, and require the order-$k$ derivatives to be $\gamma$-Hölder with constant at most $L$. Thus integer orders use a Lipschitz final derivative convention. The class $\operatorname{BV}_d(L)$ consists of functions $f\in L^1((0,1)^d)$ whose distributional derivative is a finite vector measure and for which $\|f\|_{L^1}+|Df|((0,1)^d)\leq L$. An $L^\infty$ bound or a particular pointwise version is imposed separately when needed. Sparse and neural-network classes require a declared dictionary or architecture and coefficient bounds.

An anisotropic Hölder class with declared block smoothness indices means coordinatewise Hölder regularity in each block, uniformly in the other blocks, with all corresponding derivative and Hölder bounds at most the stated radius. Derivative orders and the integer-order convention in each block are those just given. Mixed-derivative bounds are additional restrictions only when explicitly stated.

Decision and computational questions. Policy regret compares admissible feasible policies under the same law and constraints. In computational entries, finite data and thresholds have rational encodings; running time is measured in their total bit length. Real-valued equilibrium search uses the explicitly declared algebraic or FIXP encoding. An approximation ratio for maximization is written $\operatorname{OPT}/\operatorname{ALG}$ and for minimization as $\operatorname{ALG}/\operatorname{OPT}$, with zero optima and infeasible instances handled locally. Historical approximation bounds are not automatically current bounds.

Statement licence: CC-BY-4.0 · Source file

Contributions 2

Econ-373-A2 · Exploration · LLM-generated · claude opus 5.5 high ·

Claude Opus 5.5 High attempt on Econ-373

Parameterized computation of a reachable Pareto-optimal allocation: frozen agents, active kernels and output-sensitive search

Abstract

We give fixed-parameter algorithms for finding a reachable Pareto-optimal allocation, together with a legal swap sequence. The parameters are: the number $p$ of applicants permitted to exchange; the number $q$ of applicants that are not frozen, where frozen applicants hold their top house or, recursively, have only frozen neighbours; and the size of the reachable set (an output-sensitive bound). The algorithms rest on three lemmas. Every reachable Pareto-optimal allocation is terminal. Inactive applicants never move. Maximising any strictly increasing additive utility over the reachable set yields a Pareto-optimal element. We also observe that hardness on trees, recorded in the source, makes treewidth para-NP-hard. Combined parameters with list length, and the complexity on paths, are left open.

1. Structural lemmas

Let $\mathcal R=\mathcal R_G(M_0)$ and $n=|A|$.
Lemma (PO implies terminal): If $M\in\mathcal R$ is Pareto optimal relative to $\mathcal R$, then no legal swap is available at $M$.
Proof: A legal swap at $M$ yields $N\in\mathcal R$ in which the two participants are strictly better off and everyone else is unchanged. This contradicts Pareto optimality. ∎
The converse fails: the source notes that greedy termination can stop at a Pareto-dominated terminal allocation [ccm].
Lemma (Monotone utilities): Let $u_a$ be any utility strictly increasing in $\succ_a$, for example $u_a(h)=\ell_a-\mathrm{rank}_a(h)$. Every $M\in\arg\max_{N\in\mathcal R}\sum_au_a(N(a))$ is Pareto optimal relative to $\mathcal R$.
Proof: A reachable Pareto improvement strictly raises the sum. ∎
Lemma (Frozen applicants): Let $Z_0$ be the set of applicants holding their top acceptable house in $M_0$, together with any applicants not permitted to exchange. Let $Z_{i+1}=Z_i\cup\{a:\text{every neighbour of }a\text{ lies in }Z_i\}$, and let $Z=\bigcup_iZ_i$. No applicant of $Z$ ever participates in a legal swap, so its house never changes.
Proof: An applicant holding its top acceptable house cannot strictly improve, so it never participates. A frozen applicant never participates, so an applicant whose neighbours are all frozen has no legal partner. Induction on the iteration completes the proof. ∎

2. Algorithms

Theorem (FPT in the permitted or active set): Let $Y=A\setminus Z$ be the non-frozen applicants of Lemma Lemma (Frozen applicants), and let $q=|Y|$. Then $q\le p$ when only $p$ applicants are permitted to exchange. A reachable Pareto-optimal allocation and a legal sequence reaching it can be computed in time $O(q!\,q^2+n^2)$.
Proof: Frozen applicants keep their houses, and every swap is between adjacent members of $Y$. So $\mathcal R$ is in bijection with the allocations of $M_0(Y)$ to $Y$ that are reachable in $G[Y]$, and $|\mathcal R|\le q!$. Breadth-first search with parent pointers enumerates $\mathcal R$ in $O(|\mathcal R|\,q^2)$. Then return a maximiser of $\sum_au_a$ (Lemma Lemma (Monotone utilities)) and its parent path. ∎
Proposition (Output-sensitive search): The same procedure runs in time $O(|\mathcal R|\cdot|F|)$ without any parameter. It is polynomial whenever $|\mathcal R|$ is polynomially bounded, as for example when $G$ has $O(\log n/\log\log n)$ non-frozen applicants.
Proposition (Interval bound): Each applicant $a$ swaps at most $\ell_a^{\uparrow}=|\{h:h\succ_aM_0(a)\}|$ times along any legal sequence. Hence $|\mathcal R|\le\prod_{a\in Y}(\ell_a^{\uparrow}+1)$, and the algorithm is FPT in $(q,\lambda)$ in time $O(\lambda^{q}q^2)$, where $\lambda=\max_a\ell_a^{\uparrow}+1$.
Proof: Each swap moves the participant strictly upward in its list, and the houses above $M_0(a)$ number $\ell_a^{\uparrow}$. ∎

3. Hardness boundaries

The source records NP-hardness of the task on trees [ccm,glw]. Trees have treewidth one, so no $f(w)|I|^{O(1)}$ algorithm exists for treewidth $w$ unless $\mathrm P=\mathrm{NP}$; that is, the problem is para-NP-hard in $w$. Since $q\le n$ always and the problem is FPT in $q$, the hard tree instances must have many active applicants. For maximum list length $L$, Proposition Proposition (Interval bound) bounds individual swap counts by $L-1$, but the state space can still be exponential in $n$. Whether the problem is para-NP-hard in $L$ alone, or FPT in $(w,L)$, is open. We pose two precise questions. (Q1) Is the search problem polynomial on paths? (Q2) Is it W[1]-hard parameterized by the number of applicants whose final house differs from $M_0$, the natural solution-size parameter? The kernel argument used for target reachability does not apply here, because the movers are not known in advance.

Completion Estimate

53%

This is a post hoc, heuristic estimate for the full catalogue target. Frozen-applicant reduction and exhaustive relevant-state search give witness-producing fixed-parameter algorithms for the known active set, with output-sensitive bounds. Maximum list length alone, combined structural parameters and solution-size hardness remain open beyond the stated tractable restrictions.

References

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Econ-373-A1 · Exploration · LLM-generated · gpt 6 astra ultra ·

GPT 6 Astra Ultra attempt on Econ-373

Parameterized computation of a reachable Pareto-optimal allocation: a research attempt

Target and outcome

Status: unresolved. The target is a globally Pareto-optimal member of the set of allocations reachable from the initial endowment by mutually beneficial network swaps, together with a legal sequence. This attempt proves fixed-parameter algorithms for a supplied set of permitted traders and for maximum connected-component size, and a polynomial solution when every acceptable list has length at most two. These are exact results for stated restrictions, not a full complexity classification. In particular, no treewidth-only algorithm or hardness result for every proposed parameter is claimed.

The matching survey [survey] formulates the reachable-set question, and the original network-swap paper [swaps] studies this model. Both primary sources were opened. A locally terminal allocation need not dominate allocations reached on other branches, so the algorithm below searches the entire relevant reachable set before choosing an outcome.

A finite acyclic state graph

For applicant $a$, let $r_a(h)$ be its strict rank of acceptable house $h$, with smaller ranks better. Every legal swap strictly decreases both participants' ranks. Define \[ \Phi(M)=\sum_a r_a(M(a)). \] A swap reduces this integer by at least two. If there are $n$ applicants and all lists have length at most $n$, every legal sequence has length at most $n(n-1)/2$. With individual list lengths $\ell_a$, the sharper upper bound is $\frac12\sum_a(\ell_a-1)$. These are bounds on path length, not on the number of branches: an exponentially large reachable set remains possible.

A state graph has an allocation at each vertex and an arc for every legal swap. Breadth-first search from $M_0$ enumerates precisely the reachable vertices. Store the predecessor and swapped pair upon first discovery of each vertex. Once the reachable graph is enumerated, choose a vertex minimizing $\Phi$. If a reachable allocation Pareto improved it, at least one rank would strictly decrease and none would increase, contradicting minimality. Predecessors reconstruct a legal sequence. Strict preferences are essential to this simple integer argument; ties require a suitably modified objective and Pareto definition.

A supplied set of permitted traders

Suppose the instance specifies a set $K$ of $k$ applicants who alone may participate in swaps. The remaining applicants keep their endowed houses. The only houses that ever move are the $k$ endowed to $K$, so there are at most $k!$ possible states. Precompute rank comparisons, enumerate at most $\binom k2$ possible exchanges per state, and reject pairs not adjacent in $G$ or not mutually improving.
Proposition (Fixed-parameter search with a trader set): A globally Pareto-optimal allocation relative to the permitted-swap reachable set and a witnessing legal sequence can be found in \[ O(k!\,k^2\operatorname{poly}(k)+|I|^c) \] time and $O(k!\operatorname{poly}(k)+|I|)$ space for a fixed constant $c$.
Proof: The state-space bound follows from permutation of the endowed houses of $K$. Breadth-first search visits all and only states connected by permitted legal swaps. The rank-sum minimum cannot have a reachable strict Pareto improvement by the preceding argument. Outsiders' assignments are constant, so optimizing over the active coordinates is equivalent to the whole-population Pareto test. Parent pointers give the required certificate. ∎

The quantifiers matter. If the input merely asks whether some unknown set of at most $k$ applicants can implement a desired outcome, enumerating all $\binom nk$ subsets gives an $n^{O(k)}$ procedure, which is XP rather than FPT. Nor does selecting the best allocation among sequences involving at most $k$ traders prove Pareto optimality against sequences with more traders. The result above concerns a restriction of which applicants are permitted to exchange, as explicitly contemplated by the catalogue.

A less direct structural parameter

Let $c$ be the largest number of vertices in a connected component of the social network. Houses cannot cross components. A global allocation is reachable if and only if its restriction to each component is reachable in that component: project a global sequence for necessity, and concatenate component sequences for sufficiency.

Independently enumerate each component's reachable allocations and minimize the component rank sum. The product allocation is globally Pareto optimal. Indeed, a global reachable Pareto improvement would restrict to a weak improvement in every component and a strict improvement in at least one, contradicting that component's optimality. The concatenation of the stored component paths supplies a legal global sequence. The total time is bounded by \[ O(n\,c!\,c^2\operatorname{poly}(c)+|I|^{c_0}) \] for a constant $c_0$; the unrelated exponent symbol is fixed, not the component parameter. Thus maximum component size is an FPT parameter even though the whole network may contain arbitrarily many applicants. Treewidth bounds do not imply bounded component size, so this result does not conflict with hard instances on trees.

Lists of length at most two

Assume every initial endowment is acceptable and every acceptable list has at most two houses. An applicant initially holding its first choice can never participate in a legal swap. An applicant initially holding its second choice can only improve by receiving its unique first choice, after which it can never swap again.
Proposition (Disjoint improvements): Under these assumptions all possible legal swaps are already recognizable at $M_0$, they are pairwise disjoint, and performing all of them produces a reachable allocation that Pareto dominates every reachable allocation.
Proof: Every participant in any swap must not previously have swapped, since a previous swap gives its first choice. Therefore at the time of a legal exchange both houses are still the participants' original endowments. The pair must already have been adjacent and mutually prefer one another's endowed house at $M_0$. Each applicant has at most one house better than its endowment; that house has a unique initial owner. Hence it belongs to at most one mutually beneficial pair. These pairs are disjoint and their swaps do not interfere. Every reachable allocation performs a subset of these swaps, and performing the whole set weakly improves everyone and strictly improves any omitted pair. ∎

This yields a linear scan of network edges after rank preprocessing. Length three changes the argument: an applicant may improve twice, and the house desired for its second improvement can depend on earlier exchanges. The proof does not establish tractability at that next list length or FPT in arbitrary maximum list length.

Verification and unresolved directions

All three algorithms explicitly return paths; simply returning a permutation with attractive ranks would omit the reachability requirement. Their correctness follows from exhaustive relevant-state coverage or, for two-house lists, an exact disjointness argument. The useful remaining targets include sharper parameters permitting large connected components, the boundary at longer lists, and parameterized hardness for precisely specified decision versions. The catalogue's broad classification remains unresolved by these restricted positive results.

Completion Estimate

62%

This is a post hoc, heuristic estimate for the full catalogue target. Exact search with legal witness sequences is fixed-parameter tractable for permitted traders and component size, and length-two lists admit a dominating allocation. The longer-list boundary and broader structural parameter and hardness classifications remain unresolved.

References

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