Econ-213 · economics · computer science · Computational economics

Econ-213 · CS-831

Exact complexity of an Arrow--Debreu equilibrium

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C63 — Computational Techniques - Simulation Modeling Economics catalogue openaigpt 6 astra ultra 15% cataloguednot recordedOpen

Statement

GE-01 |  General equilibrium and computation

Published question, open in the cited version

Definitions and assumptions

An economy has $L$ commodities, consumers $i=1,\ldots,m$, and firms $j=1,\ldots,n$. Consumer $i$ has a closed convex consumption set $X_i\subset\R^L$ bounded below, a continuous concave nonsatiated utility $u_i:X_i\to\R$, endowment $\omega_i$, and nonnegative profit shares $\alpha_{ij}$ with $\sum_i\alpha_{ij}=1$. Require a bundle $\underline x_i\in X_i$ with $\underline x_i<\omega_i$ coordinatewise. Each closed convex production set $Y_j$ contains $0$; with $Y=\sum_jY_j$, require $Y\cap\R^L_+=Y\cap(-Y)=\{0\}$.

Use the finite input representation of Section 6.1.1 of the reference: rational endowments, shares and consumption lower bounds; convex inequalities and linear equalities satisfying Slater's condition for feasible sets; algebraic pseudogates for the required utility supergradients and constraint subgradients; and an explicit rational bound on feasible production tuples. The promises in that section and its existence theorem are part of the input specification.

An equilibrium consists of $p\in\R^L_+$, $\sum_\ell p_\ell=1$, consumption $x_i$, and production $y_j$ satisfying \[ y_j\in\argmax_{y\in Y_j}p\cdot y,\qquad x_i\in\argmax_{x\in X_i}\{u_i(x):p\cdot x\le p\cdot\omega_i+\textstyle\sum_j\alpha_{ij}p\cdot y_j\}, \] \[ z:=\sum_ix_i-\sum_i\omega_i-\sum_jy_j\le0,\qquad p\cdot z=0. \] Here $z\le0$ allows disposal of goods priced at zero.

Formal question

Is the total search problem of finding such an exact equilibrium FIXP-hard under the polynomial-time reductions used in the reference? FIXP is the class of real search problems reducible to finding an exact fixed point of a continuous algebraic-circuit self-map of a compact convex domain; solutions may be irrational. Together with the cited membership theorem, hardness would give FIXP-completeness for this promised input class.

Scope and status

The encoding and existence promises are essential: hardness for a market family allowing nonexistence does not automatically establish hardness for this total search problem. The question concerns price-taking competitive allocations and is distinct from weak approximate equilibrium computation. It is explicitly open in the April 2023 source; no universal current-status claim is made.

References for the source of the problem

Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Kasper Høgh, and Alexandros Hollender, FIXP-membership via Convex Optimization: Games, Cakes, and Markets, arXiv:2111.06878v3, revised 25 April 2023. Definitions and encoding: Sections 6.1 and 6.1.1; open question: Section 7, pp. 44--45. https://arxiv.org/pdf/2111.06878v3. Journal DOI: https://doi.org/10.1137/22M1472656.

Common conventions: Source mathematical conventions

Well-defined objects. All probability spaces and measurable variables are specified or inherited from a local statistical model. Expectations used as finite targets require the stated integrability. A decision rule or estimator is measurable with respect to its available information; randomized rules may use an auxiliary independent random variable. Norms without a subscript are Euclidean in finite-dimensional spaces. An optimizer is requested only when attainment is assured; otherwise the question concerns the optimal value and $\varepsilon$-optimal admissible rules for every $\varepsilon>0$.

Identification. A structural model $m\in\mathcal M$ implies an observable law $P_m^{\rm obs}$ and target $\theta(m)$. The target is point identified on $\mathcal M$ if \[ P_{m_1}^{\rm obs}=P_{m_2}^{\rm obs} \quad\Longrightarrow\quad\theta(m_1)=\theta(m_2) \qquad(m_1,m_2\in\mathcal M). \] When this fails, the sharp identified set is \[ \Theta(P;\mathcal M)=\{\theta(m):m\in\mathcal M, P_m^{\rm obs}=P\}. \] Specifying an intervention or estimand does not establish identification. Positivity, exclusion, causal sufficiency, measurement restrictions, and transport assumptions are substantive local inputs, never automatic consequences of notation.

Minimax risk and nontrivial inference. For a statistical experiment with data law $P^{(n)}$, target $\theta(P)$, and nonnegative loss $\ell$, define \[ \mathcal R_n(\mathcal P,\ell) =\inf_{\widehat\theta_n}\sup_{P\in\mathcal P} \E_{P^{(n)}}\ell(\widehat\theta_n,\theta(P)). \] The infimum is over measurable estimators. A sharp rate is a sequence $r_n$ for which $0<c\leq C<\infty$, independent of $n$, satisfies $c r_n\leq\mathcal R_n\leq C r_n$ for all sufficiently large $n$. Squared-error parametric risk is of order $n^{-1}$; the corresponding root-mean-squared error is of order $n^{-1/2}$. These different conventions are distinguished locally. A uniform asymptotic confidence region $C_n$ must satisfy \[ \liminf_{n\to\infty}\inf_{P\in\mathcal P} \Pr_{P^{(n)}}\{\theta(P)\in C_n\}\geq 1-\alpha, \qquad 0<\alpha<1, \] together with an informative diameter or expected-width requirement. Coverage alone permits the vacuous whole parameter space. Testing questions similarly impose both size control and power against a declared separated alternative class.

Binary causal baseline. When an entry explicitly invokes this baseline, one observes independent copies of $O=(X,W,Y)$, with $W\in\{0,1\}$ and potential outcomes $Y(0),Y(1)$. Assume consistency $Y=Y(W)$, no interference, conditional exchangeability $(Y(0),Y(1))\perp W\mid X$, and overlap $\epsilon\leq e(X)\leq1-\epsilon$ almost surely for a fixed $0<\epsilon<1/2$, where \[ e(x)=\Pr(W=1\mid X=x),\qquad m_w(x)=\E[Y\mid W=w,X=x],\qquad \tau(x)=m_1(x)-m_0(x). \] These assumptions identify conditional mean effects almost everywhere under the covariate law. Pointwise or uniform effects require appropriate regularity and a specified support. Continuous treatment, longitudinal data, adaptive experiments, and network interference require their own assumptions in place of this baseline. Bounded outcomes, densities, and smoothness are additional assumptions only where stated.

Function classes. On $[0,1]^d$, $\mathcal H_d^s(L)$ is the isotropic Hölder ball of radius $L>0$: put $k=\lceil s\rceil-1$ and $\gamma=s-k\in(0,1]$, bound derivatives through order $k$, and require the order-$k$ derivatives to be $\gamma$-Hölder with constant at most $L$. Thus integer orders use a Lipschitz final derivative convention. The class $\operatorname{BV}_d(L)$ consists of functions $f\in L^1((0,1)^d)$ whose distributional derivative is a finite vector measure and for which $\|f\|_{L^1}+|Df|((0,1)^d)\leq L$. An $L^\infty$ bound or a particular pointwise version is imposed separately when needed. Sparse and neural-network classes require a declared dictionary or architecture and coefficient bounds.

An anisotropic Hölder class with declared block smoothness indices means coordinatewise Hölder regularity in each block, uniformly in the other blocks, with all corresponding derivative and Hölder bounds at most the stated radius. Derivative orders and the integer-order convention in each block are those just given. Mixed-derivative bounds are additional restrictions only when explicitly stated.

Decision and computational questions. Policy regret compares admissible feasible policies under the same law and constraints. In computational entries, finite data and thresholds have rational encodings; running time is measured in their total bit length. Real-valued equilibrium search uses the explicitly declared algebraic or FIXP encoding. An approximation ratio for maximization is written $\operatorname{OPT}/\operatorname{ALG}$ and for minimization as $\operatorname{ALG}/\operatorname{OPT}$, with zero optima and infeasible instances handled locally. Historical approximation bounds are not automatically current bounds.

Statement licence: CC-BY-4.0 · Source file

Contributions 1

Econ-213-A1 · Exploration · LLM-generated · gpt 6 astra ultra ·

GPT 6 Astra Ultra attempt on Econ-213

Exact complexity of an Arrow--Debreu equilibrium: An exact radical family inside the promised economy class

Target and scope

The original question asks for FIXP-hardness of exact Arrow--Debreu equilibrium in the promised finite representation of [fixp, Sections 6.1--6.1.1 and 7]. The equilibrium conditions include \[ x_i\in\arg\max\{u_i(x):p\cdot x\le p\cdot\omega_i\}, \qquad \sum_i x_i\le\sum_i\omega_i,\qquad p\cdot\left(\sum_i x_i-\sum_i\omega_i\right)=0. \] Production is absent in the family below. The result gives a scalar equation, an exact active-set solution, and a rationally encoded instance whose unique normalized equilibrium prices are irrational. These facts clarify an encoding issue; they do not constitute a FIXP-hardness reduction.

There are two commodities and $m\ge1$ consumers. For positive rational $a_i,e_i,H_i$, set \[ X_i=\mathbb R_+^2,\qquad \omega_i=(e_i,H_i),\qquad u_i(x_1,x_2)=x_2+\frac{a_i x_1}{1+x_1}. \] Write $E=\sum_i e_i$ and $A=\max_i a_i$, and assume $H_i>AE$ for every $i$. These are concave, continuous, nonsatiated utilities; their gradients are rational functions with positive denominators on $X_i$. The consumption inequalities have strict feasible points, and $(0,0)<\omega_i$. With no production the production bound and no-arbitrage promises are vacuous; a zero-production firm could equivalently be represented by linear equalities. Thus this is a subfamily of the canonical promised class, not a market obtained by discarding existence conditions.

A scalar equilibrium equation

Theorem: There is a unique equilibrium price ratio $t=p_1/p_2$, and it is the unique positive solution of \[ \sum_{i=1}^m \max\{\sqrt{a_i/t}-1,0\}=E. \tag{1} \] The equilibrium allocation is unique and equals \[ x_{i1}=\max\{\sqrt{a_i/t}-1,0\},\qquad x_{i2}=H_i+t(e_i-x_{i1}), \tag{2} \] with normalized prices $(t/(1+t),1/(1+t))$.
Proof: At an equilibrium both prices are positive. If $p_2=0$, the free second commodity makes utility unbounded on the budget set. If $p_1=0$, increasing the free first commodity strictly increases utility, with no finite maximizer. Normalize temporarily by $p_2=1$.

Every consumer spends the full budget because utility is strictly increasing in $x_2$. Substituting the budget identity leaves the strictly concave scalar objective $a_i x/(1+x)-tx$ on $0\le x\le e_i+H_i/t$. If $t\ge A$, its derivative is nonpositive everywhere and strictly negative for $x>0$; all first-good demands are zero, contradicting clearing of the positively priced aggregate endowment $E$. Thus $0<t<A$ at equilibrium. Feasibility gives $x_{i1}\le E$, so \[ x_{i2}=H_i+t(e_i-x_{i1})\ge H_i-AE>0. \] The wealth bound therefore cannot bind the first-good optimum. Its first-order and boundary conditions give (2), and clearing gives (1).

The left side of (1) is continuous, tends to infinity as $t\downarrow0$, and is zero at $t=A$. It is strictly decreasing whenever positive: at least one active summand then strictly decreases. Consequently the positive solution is unique. Conversely, let $t$ be that solution. Each first-good quantity is at most $E$, so every second-good quantity in (2) is positive. The first-order calculation proves consumer optimality. Summing (2) clears both commodities, giving an equilibrium. Strict concavity of the scalar objective proves allocation uniqueness. ∎

An exact active-set representation

Sort the coefficients so $a_1\ge\cdots\ge a_m$ and set $a_{m+1}=0$. For $k=1,\ldots,m$, define \[ t_k=\left(\frac{\sum_{i=1}^k\sqrt{a_i}}{E+k}\right)^2. \tag{3} \]
Proposition: At least one index $k$ satisfies $a_k>t_k\ge a_{k+1}$; for each such index, $t=t_k$ is the equilibrium ratio. Formula (3), together with positive square-root specifications, is a finite exact algebraic representation of the answer.
Proof: Take the unique root of (1) and let $k$ be the number of indices with $a_i>t$. This number is positive, and its indices form an initial segment. Equation (1) becomes $\sum_{i=1}^k\sqrt{a_i}/\sqrt t-k=E$, which is (3). The definition of the active set gives the two inequalities. Conversely, those inequalities imply that exactly the first $k$ terms contribute positively in (1), with any equality $a_{k+1}=t_k$ contributing zero. Substitution proves (1), and uniqueness identifies the price. ∎
This representation does not silently claim a polynomial bit-complexity algorithm for comparing arbitrary sums of radicals. A polynomial-size radical expression and an efficiently decidable sign of an expression are different computational objects. Approximate bisection of the strictly monotone equation is a further, weaker output task.
Example: Let $m=2$, $(a_1,a_2)=(1,2)$, $e_1=e_2=1$, and $H_1=H_2=10$. Both consumers are active and \[ t=\frac{3+2\sqrt2}{16},\qquad x_{11}=\frac4{1+\sqrt2}-1,\qquad x_{21}=\frac{4\sqrt2}{1+\sqrt2}-1. \] The first-good quantities are positive and sum to two; the second-good quantities in (2) are positive. The ratio satisfies $256t^2-96t+1=0$ and is irrational. Since $t=p_1/(1-p_1)$, the normalized first price is irrational as well. Rational input alone therefore does not justify a rational-output exact algorithm.

Remaining gap

The family reduces to one monotone scalar equation with an explicitly identified active set. It has neither the multidimensional feedback nor a solution-preserving reduction from arbitrary algebraic fixed points needed for FIXP-hardness. The membership theorem in [fixp] remains the literature input; the present derivation supplies a transparent promised subclass and an irrationality witness, not completeness of the full search problem or a lower bound for this subclass.

Completion Estimate

15%

This is a post hoc, heuristic estimate for the full catalogue target. The attempt constructs a promised Arrow-Debreu subclass with a unique exact radical equilibrium and rational inputs yielding irrational prices. FIXP-hardness still requires a polynomial solution-preserving reduction from general algebraic fixed points; the scalar active-set calculation supplies no such reduction.

References

  • [fixp] A. Filos-Ratsikas, K. A. Hansen, K. Høgh and A. Hollender. FIXP-membership via Convex Optimization: Games, Cakes, and Markets, arXiv:2111.06878v3 (2023), Sections 6.1--6.1.1 and 7. https://arxiv.org/pdf/2111.06878v3.

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