Econ-69 · economics · Economics

Econ-69

Competitive dynamics with dispersed imperfect information

LLM status Open unverified

D83 — Search - Learning - Information and Knowledge - Communication - Belief - Unawareness Economics catalogue openaigpt 6 astra ultra 15% cataloguednot recordedOpen

Statement

MA-03 |  Macroeconomics and information

Historical research agenda formalization

Definitions and assumptions

Fix a dynamic competitive economy with a measurable population $i\in I$, population measure $\lambda$, aggregate fundamentals $x_t$, individual states $a_{it}$, and specified state-transition and signal kernels, with a normalized public price vector $p_t\in\Delta_d$ for $d$ commodities. Assume all conditional distributions below exist and aggregate integrals are measurable. Agent $i$ observes private signals and the public price history, generating information $\mathcal F_{it}$. It maximizes \[ \E\left[\sum_{t=0}^{T}\beta^tu_i(c_{it},a_{it})\right] \] over $\mathcal F_{it}$-adapted controls, subject to a declared competitive budget set $\mathcal B_i(a_{it},p_t)$ and the specified individual transition law. Take continuous utilities and compact feasible control sets; the aggregate resource constraint is $\int c_{it}\,d\lambda(i)=w_t(x_t)$, with production added when specified in the primitives.

Let $H_t$ denote the full model history relevant to future fundamentals and allocations, and define $b_{it}=\mathcal L(H_t\mid\mathcal F_{it})$. The joint distribution $\mu_t=\lambda\circ(i\mapsto(a_{it},b_{it}))^{-1}$ summarizes individual states and beliefs. An equilibrium consists of prices, optimal controls and a probability law consistent with the primitive kernels, market clearing, and these conditional-belief definitions.

Formal question

For a specified class of non-Gaussian signals and heterogeneous information-update rules, prove equilibrium existence and characterize its aggregate dynamics and endogenous belief distribution. Determine which state variables give a recursive description and when a tractable statistic of $\mu_t$ is sufficient. Formally, a proposed statistic must determine prices, aggregate controls and its own conditional next-period law throughout the admissible equilibrium family.

Scope and status

Beliefs concern enough history to predict other agents' aggregate behavior; a posterior over current productivity alone need not suffice. Price observations are included because prices can convey information. This is a family of theorem problems motivated by a 2010 research frontier, not a quoted conjecture or a claim that all special cases remain open. Agents are price takers in the retained formulation.

References for the source of the problem

N. Gregory Mankiw and Ricardo Reis, Imperfect Information and Aggregate Supply, NBER Working Paper 15773 (February 2010), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w15773/w15773.pdf. Verified handbook version: Handbook of Monetary Economics 3A, Chapter 5, especially Sections 7.2, 7.4 and 7.5, "The Research Frontier." https://personal.lse.ac.uk/reisr/papers/10-HofME.pdf.

Common conventions: Source mathematical conventions

Well-defined objects. All probability spaces and measurable variables are specified or inherited from a local statistical model. Expectations used as finite targets require the stated integrability. A decision rule or estimator is measurable with respect to its available information; randomized rules may use an auxiliary independent random variable. Norms without a subscript are Euclidean in finite-dimensional spaces. An optimizer is requested only when attainment is assured; otherwise the question concerns the optimal value and $\varepsilon$-optimal admissible rules for every $\varepsilon>0$.

Identification. A structural model $m\in\mathcal M$ implies an observable law $P_m^{\rm obs}$ and target $\theta(m)$. The target is point identified on $\mathcal M$ if \[ P_{m_1}^{\rm obs}=P_{m_2}^{\rm obs} \quad\Longrightarrow\quad\theta(m_1)=\theta(m_2) \qquad(m_1,m_2\in\mathcal M). \] When this fails, the sharp identified set is \[ \Theta(P;\mathcal M)=\{\theta(m):m\in\mathcal M, P_m^{\rm obs}=P\}. \] Specifying an intervention or estimand does not establish identification. Positivity, exclusion, causal sufficiency, measurement restrictions, and transport assumptions are substantive local inputs, never automatic consequences of notation.

Minimax risk and nontrivial inference. For a statistical experiment with data law $P^{(n)}$, target $\theta(P)$, and nonnegative loss $\ell$, define \[ \mathcal R_n(\mathcal P,\ell) =\inf_{\widehat\theta_n}\sup_{P\in\mathcal P} \E_{P^{(n)}}\ell(\widehat\theta_n,\theta(P)). \] The infimum is over measurable estimators. A sharp rate is a sequence $r_n$ for which $0<c\leq C<\infty$, independent of $n$, satisfies $c r_n\leq\mathcal R_n\leq C r_n$ for all sufficiently large $n$. Squared-error parametric risk is of order $n^{-1}$; the corresponding root-mean-squared error is of order $n^{-1/2}$. These different conventions are distinguished locally. A uniform asymptotic confidence region $C_n$ must satisfy \[ \liminf_{n\to\infty}\inf_{P\in\mathcal P} \Pr_{P^{(n)}}\{\theta(P)\in C_n\}\geq 1-\alpha, \qquad 0<\alpha<1, \] together with an informative diameter or expected-width requirement. Coverage alone permits the vacuous whole parameter space. Testing questions similarly impose both size control and power against a declared separated alternative class.

Binary causal baseline. When an entry explicitly invokes this baseline, one observes independent copies of $O=(X,W,Y)$, with $W\in\{0,1\}$ and potential outcomes $Y(0),Y(1)$. Assume consistency $Y=Y(W)$, no interference, conditional exchangeability $(Y(0),Y(1))\perp W\mid X$, and overlap $\epsilon\leq e(X)\leq1-\epsilon$ almost surely for a fixed $0<\epsilon<1/2$, where \[ e(x)=\Pr(W=1\mid X=x),\qquad m_w(x)=\E[Y\mid W=w,X=x],\qquad \tau(x)=m_1(x)-m_0(x). \] These assumptions identify conditional mean effects almost everywhere under the covariate law. Pointwise or uniform effects require appropriate regularity and a specified support. Continuous treatment, longitudinal data, adaptive experiments, and network interference require their own assumptions in place of this baseline. Bounded outcomes, densities, and smoothness are additional assumptions only where stated.

Function classes. On $[0,1]^d$, $\mathcal H_d^s(L)$ is the isotropic Hölder ball of radius $L>0$: put $k=\lceil s\rceil-1$ and $\gamma=s-k\in(0,1]$, bound derivatives through order $k$, and require the order-$k$ derivatives to be $\gamma$-Hölder with constant at most $L$. Thus integer orders use a Lipschitz final derivative convention. The class $\operatorname{BV}_d(L)$ consists of functions $f\in L^1((0,1)^d)$ whose distributional derivative is a finite vector measure and for which $\|f\|_{L^1}+|Df|((0,1)^d)\leq L$. An $L^\infty$ bound or a particular pointwise version is imposed separately when needed. Sparse and neural-network classes require a declared dictionary or architecture and coefficient bounds.

An anisotropic Hölder class with declared block smoothness indices means coordinatewise Hölder regularity in each block, uniformly in the other blocks, with all corresponding derivative and Hölder bounds at most the stated radius. Derivative orders and the integer-order convention in each block are those just given. Mixed-derivative bounds are additional restrictions only when explicitly stated.

Decision and computational questions. Policy regret compares admissible feasible policies under the same law and constraints. In computational entries, finite data and thresholds have rational encodings; running time is measured in their total bit length. Real-valued equilibrium search uses the explicitly declared algebraic or FIXP encoding. An approximation ratio for maximization is written $\operatorname{OPT}/\operatorname{ALG}$ and for minimization as $\operatorname{ALG}/\operatorname{OPT}$, with zero optima and infeasible instances handled locally. Historical approximation bounds are not automatically current bounds.

Statement licence: CC-BY-4.0 · Source file

Contributions 1

Econ-69-A1 · Exploration · LLM-generated · gpt 6 astra ultra ·

GPT 6 Astra Ultra attempt on Econ-69

Imperfect information: a recursive benchmark and failure of posterior-mean closure

Problem: D83-67. Status: Partial results; the complete catalogue target remains unresolved.

Problem and scope

The catalogue asks for equilibrium and an adequate recursive state with non-Gaussian signals and dispersed information. We give a finite-state public-information benchmark, then a common-prior counterexample to using only the posterior mean of productivity. Since even the public-information subcase defeats that proposed statistic, it cannot be universally sufficient in the larger family. The broader motivation is the imperfect-information research agenda surveyed by Mankiw and Reis [MR].

A one-period competitive market

A unit mass of identical price-taking households has terminal endowment $e(X)=1+X$, where $X$ takes values in a finite subset of $[0,H]$. There is a zero-net-supply security paying $X$ and a riskless numeraire. At relative security price $p\in[0,H]$, a household chooses $a\in[-\bar a,\bar a]$ and consumes \[ c=1+X+a(X-p),\qquad 0<\bar a<1/(H+1). \] The restriction makes consumption strictly positive at every state and candidate price. Preferences are $\mathbb E_b[\log c]$ under the common posterior $b$. The initial security endowment is zero. The security purchase is financed in the numeraire; no other intertemporal transfer is permitted. A normalized two-price vector is $(1,p)/(1+p)$, so working with relative $p$ does not change the catalogue's price normalization.
Theorem (Equilibrium price from the entire posterior): For every posterior $b$, the price \begin{equation} p(b)=\frac{\mathbb E_b[X/(1+X)]}{\mathbb E_b[1/(1+X)]}\label{wsref-0-65-71-3a-70-72-69-63-65} \end{equation} and allocation $a=0$ form a competitive equilibrium. The price is the only relative price that can support market clearing. If $b$ gives positive probability to two distinct values of $X$, each household's optimal holding at this price is uniquely zero.
Proof: The denominator is positive and the ratio is a weighted average of $X$, hence lies in $[0,H]$. Utility is differentiable and concave in $a$, with derivative at zero \[ \mathbb E_b\left[\frac{X-p}{1+X}\right]. \] Equation (eq:price) makes this derivative zero, so concavity makes zero optimal. The second derivative is $-\mathbb E_b[(X-p)^2/c^2]$, strictly negative when the payoff is nonconstant. Market clearing follows because all households hold zero. At any other price the derivative at zero is nonzero. Concavity and identical preferences then imply that every optimum has the same strict sign, contradicting zero aggregate holdings. In the degenerate payoff case $X=x$ almost surely, $p=x$ makes every holding optimal and $a=0$ clears; prices above or below $x$ again produce demands of a common strict sign. ∎
Proposition (Equal posterior means, different equilibrium prices): There is one finite common-prior economy with two positive-probability public signals, both implying $\mathbb E[X\mid Y]=1$, whose equilibrium prices are respectively $1$ and $1/2$.
Proof: Take prior probabilities $(1/4,1/2,1/4)$ on $X=0,1,2$. The public signal is $Y=A$ when $X=1$ and $Y=B$ otherwise. At $A$, the posterior is concentrated on $1$, giving price $1$. At $B$, it puts equal weight on $0$ and $2$. Both posterior means equal $1$, but at $B$ the numerator of (eq:price) is $1/3$ and its denominator is $2/3$, giving price $1/2$. Both signals are already public, so conditioning on the equilibrium price provides no additional information. The comparison therefore respects Bayes' rule and price observation; it is not based on incompatible subjective beliefs. ∎

A dynamic sufficient statistic in a restricted economy

Let $X_t$ be a finite-state Markov chain with known matrix $P$. Before the date-$t$ security market, all households see a finite-valued signal $Y_t$ with likelihood $\ell_y(x)$ conditional on $X_t=x$. Signals are conditionally independent given the state path. The period-$t$ market settles after trading, and its realized endowment and security payoff publicly reveal $X_t$. There is no saving across dates, so lifetime expected utility is the discounted sum of these period utilities. The actual pretrade public information is generated by $(Y_1,\ldots,Y_t,X_1,\ldots,X_{t-1})$. Only positive-probability observation histories are used in conditional formulas.
Proposition (Exact finite-dimensional public state with settlement observations): The pretrade posterior vector \[ b_t(x)=\Pr(X_t=x\mid Y_1,\ldots,Y_t,X_1,\ldots,X_{t-1}), \] together with calendar date for a finite horizon, determines the equilibrium price, aggregate allocation, and its own conditional next-period law. After settlement at date $t$, the posterior of $X_t$ becomes a point mass at the observed $X_t$. For a next signal $y$ define \[ K_y(x)=\sum_z P(x,z)\ell_y(z),\qquad B_{x,y}(x')=\frac{P(x,x')\ell_y(x')}{K_y(x)} \quad\text{when }K_y(x)>0. \] The next pretrade posterior equals $B_{X_t,Y_{t+1}}$. Conditional on $b_t$, its law assigns mass $b_t(x)K_y(x)$ to $B_{x,y}$, summing masses when distinct pairs give the same posterior.
Proof: At settlement the common endowment $1+X_t$ reveals the current state, so the next prediction uses the row $P(X_t,\cdot)$, rather than an unupdated hidden-state filter. The Markov property and conditional independence then give $K_y$ and $B_{x,y}$ by Bayes' rule. Before settlement, $X_t$ has law $b_t$; multiplying by the conditional signal probability gives the claimed transition law, a function only of $b_t$. Period equilibrium is given by (eq:price) and zero holdings. Since controls cannot transfer resources across dates or affect states, signals or public settlement information, periodwise optimality maximizes the discounted sum. Prices are functions of the already public pretrade posterior and do not add information. This verifies all three sufficiency requirements while including the information conveyed by realized consumption and payments. ∎

Remaining gap

This construction permits non-Gaussian signals but removes dispersed private information, private saving, and endogenous information acquisition. Under private signals, the distribution of beliefs and beliefs about others may matter, and public prices can reveal information not present in each agent's signal history. The displayed finite filter cannot simply be assigned independently to each agent in such an economy. The counterexample establishes a specific obstruction to mean closure; it does not prove that every richer model requires an infinite-dimensional state.

References

  • [MR] N. G. Mankiw and R. Reis, Imperfect Information and Aggregate Supply, Handbook of Monetary Economics, Chapter 5; author manuscript, especially Sections 7.2, 7.4 and 7.5. https://personal.lse.ac.uk/reisr/papers/10-HofME.pdf. The market, calculations and counterexample here are self-contained benchmarks and are not attributed as results of that survey.

Completion Estimate

15%

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