Econ-342 · economics · computer science · Computational economics

Econ-342 · CS-884

A most-probably popular house allocation

LLM status Open unverified

C78 — Bargaining Theory - Matching Theory Economics catalogue openaigpt 6 astra ultra 59% cataloguednot recordedOpen

Statement

MM-06 |  Matching markets and allocation

Research agenda formalization

Definitions and assumptions

Consider applicants $A$, houses $H$, fixed acceptable pairs $E$, and the set $\mathcal M(I)$ of matchings in this bipartite graph. Only applicants have preferences. All acceptable assignments outrank being unmatched. A random strict preference profile $P$ is drawn using either independent explicitly supported lotteries, independent uniform tie refinements of weak orders, or an explicitly supported joint-profile lottery, with binary rational probabilities where applicable. Define popularity by \[ M\text{ popular for }P \quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad \forall N\in\mathcal M(I),\quad |\{a:N(a)\succ_a^P M(a)\}| \le |\{a:M(a)\succ_a^P N(a)\}|. \] Let $\pi_I(M)$ be the probability of this event. A single matching must be selected before the preference profile is realized.

Formal question

For each uncertainty encoding, classify the optimization task \[ \text{output }M^*\in\argmax_{M\in\mathcal M(I)}\pi_I(M) \] and its threshold counterpart $\exists M\in\mathcal M(I):\pi_I(M)\ge\tau$. Characterize polynomial-time solvable restrictions and hardness for compactly represented instances. If approximation is studied, state whether its guarantee is multiplicative or additive in $\pi_I$.

Scope and status

This formalizes the source's proposed extension from uncertainty-based stability and Pareto optimality to popular matching. It is an agenda item, not a separately numbered theorem or conjecture in that survey. Maximization differs from evaluating popularity probability for a fixed matching: polynomial evaluation on explicit support need not yield polynomial optimization. The optimum can be zero when every support profile lacks a popular matching. No existence conclusion or positivity assumption should therefore be imported from stable marriage. The formulation uses the source's one-sided house-allocation setting, rather than votes of two sides of a marriage market.

References for the source of the problem

Katarína Cechlárová, Ágnes Cseh, and David F. Manlove (2019), Selected open problems in Matching Under Preferences, Section 3.1.2, final paragraph and its "HighestProbability" template, together with Section 2.1: https://hpi.de/friedrich/docs/publications/2019/BEATCS.pdf. Haris Aziz, Péter Biró, Serge Gaspers, Ronald de Haan, Nicholas Mattei, and Baharak Rastegari (2020), Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences, model definitions and Table 3: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-019-00650-0.

Common conventions: Source mathematical conventions

Well-defined objects. All probability spaces and measurable variables are specified or inherited from a local statistical model. Expectations used as finite targets require the stated integrability. A decision rule or estimator is measurable with respect to its available information; randomized rules may use an auxiliary independent random variable. Norms without a subscript are Euclidean in finite-dimensional spaces. An optimizer is requested only when attainment is assured; otherwise the question concerns the optimal value and $\varepsilon$-optimal admissible rules for every $\varepsilon>0$.

Identification. A structural model $m\in\mathcal M$ implies an observable law $P_m^{\rm obs}$ and target $\theta(m)$. The target is point identified on $\mathcal M$ if \[ P_{m_1}^{\rm obs}=P_{m_2}^{\rm obs} \quad\Longrightarrow\quad\theta(m_1)=\theta(m_2) \qquad(m_1,m_2\in\mathcal M). \] When this fails, the sharp identified set is \[ \Theta(P;\mathcal M)=\{\theta(m):m\in\mathcal M, P_m^{\rm obs}=P\}. \] Specifying an intervention or estimand does not establish identification. Positivity, exclusion, causal sufficiency, measurement restrictions, and transport assumptions are substantive local inputs, never automatic consequences of notation.

Minimax risk and nontrivial inference. For a statistical experiment with data law $P^{(n)}$, target $\theta(P)$, and nonnegative loss $\ell$, define \[ \mathcal R_n(\mathcal P,\ell) =\inf_{\widehat\theta_n}\sup_{P\in\mathcal P} \E_{P^{(n)}}\ell(\widehat\theta_n,\theta(P)). \] The infimum is over measurable estimators. A sharp rate is a sequence $r_n$ for which $0<c\leq C<\infty$, independent of $n$, satisfies $c r_n\leq\mathcal R_n\leq C r_n$ for all sufficiently large $n$. Squared-error parametric risk is of order $n^{-1}$; the corresponding root-mean-squared error is of order $n^{-1/2}$. These different conventions are distinguished locally. A uniform asymptotic confidence region $C_n$ must satisfy \[ \liminf_{n\to\infty}\inf_{P\in\mathcal P} \Pr_{P^{(n)}}\{\theta(P)\in C_n\}\geq 1-\alpha, \qquad 0<\alpha<1, \] together with an informative diameter or expected-width requirement. Coverage alone permits the vacuous whole parameter space. Testing questions similarly impose both size control and power against a declared separated alternative class.

Binary causal baseline. When an entry explicitly invokes this baseline, one observes independent copies of $O=(X,W,Y)$, with $W\in\{0,1\}$ and potential outcomes $Y(0),Y(1)$. Assume consistency $Y=Y(W)$, no interference, conditional exchangeability $(Y(0),Y(1))\perp W\mid X$, and overlap $\epsilon\leq e(X)\leq1-\epsilon$ almost surely for a fixed $0<\epsilon<1/2$, where \[ e(x)=\Pr(W=1\mid X=x),\qquad m_w(x)=\E[Y\mid W=w,X=x],\qquad \tau(x)=m_1(x)-m_0(x). \] These assumptions identify conditional mean effects almost everywhere under the covariate law. Pointwise or uniform effects require appropriate regularity and a specified support. Continuous treatment, longitudinal data, adaptive experiments, and network interference require their own assumptions in place of this baseline. Bounded outcomes, densities, and smoothness are additional assumptions only where stated.

Function classes. On $[0,1]^d$, $\mathcal H_d^s(L)$ is the isotropic Hölder ball of radius $L>0$: put $k=\lceil s\rceil-1$ and $\gamma=s-k\in(0,1]$, bound derivatives through order $k$, and require the order-$k$ derivatives to be $\gamma$-Hölder with constant at most $L$. Thus integer orders use a Lipschitz final derivative convention. The class $\operatorname{BV}_d(L)$ consists of functions $f\in L^1((0,1)^d)$ whose distributional derivative is a finite vector measure and for which $\|f\|_{L^1}+|Df|((0,1)^d)\leq L$. An $L^\infty$ bound or a particular pointwise version is imposed separately when needed. Sparse and neural-network classes require a declared dictionary or architecture and coefficient bounds.

An anisotropic Hölder class with declared block smoothness indices means coordinatewise Hölder regularity in each block, uniformly in the other blocks, with all corresponding derivative and Hölder bounds at most the stated radius. Derivative orders and the integer-order convention in each block are those just given. Mixed-derivative bounds are additional restrictions only when explicitly stated.

Decision and computational questions. Policy regret compares admissible feasible policies under the same law and constraints. In computational entries, finite data and thresholds have rational encodings; running time is measured in their total bit length. Real-valued equilibrium search uses the explicitly declared algebraic or FIXP encoding. An approximation ratio for maximization is written $\operatorname{OPT}/\operatorname{ALG}$ and for minimization as $\operatorname{ALG}/\operatorname{OPT}$, with zero optima and infeasible instances handled locally. Historical approximation bounds are not automatically current bounds.

Statement licence: CC-BY-4.0 · Source file

Contributions 1

Econ-342-A1 · Exploration · LLM-generated · gpt 6 astra ultra ·

GPT 6 Astra Ultra attempt on Econ-342

A most-probably popular house allocation: a research attempt

Status: unresolved. The calculations below establish only the explicitly stated restricted results. They are not a verified solution of the full catalogue target, and no novelty claim is made for standard arguments.

Target and deterministic verification

Applicants alone vote between matchings; all acceptable houses are preferred to being unmatched. A matching must be chosen before a random strict preference profile is drawn. Its objective $\pi(M)$ is the probability that no competing matching defeats it by a strict majority. The original target asks for classification under explicit joint support, independent applicant lotteries and independent tie refinements.

First fix a profile $P$ and matching $M$. For every applicant $a$ and acceptable house $h$, let $w_{a,h}$ be $1,0,-1$ according as $h$ is better than, equal to, or worse than $M(a)$. Add an applicant-specific dummy house for being unmatched, with the corresponding vote weight. Maximizing total weight over matchings assigning every applicant a real or its own dummy house computes the largest voting margin against $M$. The matching $M$ itself gives margin zero; it is popular exactly when the maximum is zero. Maximum-weight bipartite matching therefore tests popularity in polynomial time. Dummy choices also count the negative votes of applicants made unmatched; ignoring those votes would give the wrong test.

For explicit profiles $P_1,\ldots,P_K$ with rational probabilities $p_k$, evaluation is consequently polynomial: $\pi(M)=\sum_kp_k\mathbf1\{M\text{ popular at }P_k\}$. Rational addition and comparison have polynomial bit complexity in the input. This establishes NP membership for the explicit-joint threshold problem but does not make optimization polynomial.

A two-applicant component and its exact behavior

Take two applicants $u,v$ and two houses $x,y$, with all four pairs acceptable. There are two complete matchings: $M^0=\{ux,vy\}$ and $M^1=\{uy,vx\}$. Three strict profiles realize the following sets of popular matchings:
  1. Both applicants receive their top house in $M^0$: $u:x\succ y$, $v:y\succ x$. Then only $M^0$ is popular.
  2. Reverse both lists. Then only $M^1$ is popular.
  3. Give both applicants the same list $x\succ y$. Then both complete matchings are popular.
For the first two claims the alternative complete matching loses two votes. No partial matching is popular: an unmatched applicant can receive a free acceptable house without changing anybody else's assignment. In the third profile the two complete matchings tie one vote each; a partial alternative cannot win, since every changed unmatched status is worse and at most one applicant can improve by taking $x$. These observations exhaust the component's possibilities.

For a disjoint union of components, a global matching is popular if and only if every component restriction is popular. A defeating alternative in one component can be joined with the unchanged matching elsewhere. Conversely every alternative has a nonpositive voting margin in each component when all component restrictions are popular, so its total margin is nonpositive. This factorization is a deterministic event statement and does not assume independent uncertainty.

Explicit-joint NP-completeness by a cut reduction

Let $G=(V,E)$ be an instance of unweighted MAX-CUT with $m=|E|>0$. Create one component of the preceding form for every vertex $v$, and interpret its selected complete matching as a bit $z_v\in\{0,1\}$. For every edge $\{u,v\}$ put two profiles into the joint lottery, each with probability $1/(2m)$:
  • one profile forces $z_u=0,z_v=1$ using the first two component profiles;
  • the other forces $z_u=1,z_v=0$;
  • all other components use the third, permissive profile.
The support has $2m$ profiles and description length polynomial in $|V|+m$. Correlation across applicants is explicit and allowed by this encoding.
Proposition: For every complete matching representing $z$, \[ \pi(M_z)=\frac{|\{\{u,v\}\in E:z_u\neq z_v\}|}{2m}. \] Every incomplete matching has popularity probability zero. Therefore the explicit-joint threshold problem is NP-complete, and exact optimization is NP-hard, even when the acceptability graph is a disjoint union of copies of $K_{2,2}$.
Proof: For each edge, precisely one of its two support profiles accepts the selected bits if the edge crosses the cut, and neither accepts them otherwise. Component factorization gives the probability formula. An incomplete matching is unpopular in every profile because some incomplete component can be augmented. Thus a cut of size at least $k$ exists if and only if a matching with probability at least $k/(2m)$ exists. Unweighted MAX-CUT is NP-complete, and polynomial verification above supplies NP membership. ∎
The reduction also preserves multiplicative approximation ratios on these instances, since both objective values differ only by $2m$. No stronger approximation hardness is claimed without an appropriate hardness theorem for MAX-CUT. Notice that each individual support profile here does possess popular matchings, but a single matching cannot generally satisfy all profiles. In these constructed instances the optimum is at most $1/2$.

An independent-uncertainty tractable restriction

For independent applicant lotteries on a disjoint union of $K_{2,2}$ components, each component has at most four strict profile outcomes. Compute its two probabilities $\pi_v(0),\pi_v(1)$ directly. Independence across components and the deterministic factorization imply \[ \pi(M_z)=\prod_{v\in V}\pi_v(z_v). \] Selecting in each component a bit with the larger local probability maximizes the product, including the possibility of zero factors. Products and comparisons of explicitly encoded rationals have polynomial bit length. Independent uniform tie refinements also fall into this restriction because each two-house list has at most two refinements. The explicit-joint reduction therefore crucially uses correlation: it cannot be silently transferred to independent lotteries on this same graph.

For general graphs with independent compact uncertainty, a fixed matching can still be evaluated by sampling profiles and running the deterministic popularity test. Hoeffding's inequality gives additive error at most $\epsilon$ with probability at least $1-\eta$ using at least $\log(2/\eta)/(2\epsilon^2)$ independent samples. Uniform control over a candidate set of $L$ matchings replaces the numerator by $\log(2L/\eta)$. This is a statistical evaluation bound, not an efficient optimization algorithm: maximizing the sampled success count over all matchings retains a combinatorial search. A multiplicative guarantee also becomes problematic near zero success probability.

Completion Estimate

59%

This is a post hoc, heuristic estimate for the full catalogue target. The attempt proves NP completeness for explicit joint popularity thresholds, polynomial evaluation, and an exact independent uncertainty algorithm on disconnected two applicant components. The full classification still lacks general independent lottery and tie refinement hardness or algorithms, together with their optimization approximation guarantees.

Checks, status and sources

The argument gives a complete classification of the explicit-joint threshold subproblem and an exact independent-uncertainty restriction. It leaves the original general independent-lottery and tie-refinement classifications, and their approximation regimes, unresolved. The reduction is presented with proof; no priority or literature-novelty claim is made.

Katarína Cechlárová, Ágnes Cseh and David F. Manlove (2019), Selected Open Problems in Matching Under Preferences, Section 3.1.2 inspected for the uncertainty models and proposed popularity extension: https://hpi.de/friedrich/docs/publications/2019/BEATCS.pdf. Michael R. Garey, David S. Johnson and Larry Stockmeyer (1976), Some Simplified NP-Complete Graph Problems, Theoretical Computer Science 1, 237--267; primary publisher abstract inspected for NP-completeness of simple unweighted MAX-CUT: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3975(76)90059-1.

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